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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Half a decade has now passed since a series of protests, most commonly referred 
to as the Arab Spring, erupted across the Middle East and North Africa.  In late 
December 2010, the world watched with anticipation as the beginning of these uprisings 
started rapidly unfolding in Tunisia after street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself 
aflame due to his ongoing indignation towards the oppressive actions regularly inflicted 
upon him by police forces. By resorting to self-immolation, one of the most extreme 
forms of political expression, he single-handedly drew statewide recognition towards the 
corrupt policies and injustices of the government. His death was the catalytic force that 
prompted thousands of Tunisians to take to the street demanding respect, democratic 
reforms and equal rights for all citizens. This pivotal moment sent sheer panic throughout 
the entire MENA region n, as other Arab leaders befittingly feared that the infectious 
contagion of mass mobilization would eventually spread to their own countries, and it 
most certainly did. The unifying theme that initially linked all the movements together 
was dissidents’ strong opposition towards longstanding, exploitative authoritarian rule 
and their intense desires for better social, economic and political rights.  
 
Background of the Problem 
 As five years have gone by since the beginning of this historic period where 
citizens residing in this vicinity of the world actively engaged in protests against their 
governments, clear observations can finally be made which highlight how the aftermath 
of these uprisings significantly vary from country to country despite originally stemming 
from shared grievances that transcended across state borders. The Arab Spring has ended 
the reign of certain country’s most enduring dictators and ignited widespread violence in 
others, while a handful of regimes successfully maintained their stronghold on power. 
This has resulted in a multitude of studies attempting to explain which causal 
mechanisms are responsible for these divergent outcomes.  A common trend that has 
developed within the academic community has tended to focus on the countries in this 
region that exhibit several shared characteristics in order to juxtapose them against one 
another to find the few crucial traits in which they differ. By doing this, scholars aim to 
directly pinpoint the infinitesimal, but nevertheless substantially important dissimilarities 
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that exist amongst these states that display seemingly identical qualities, as they are then 
believed to be the explanatory variables needed that can account for the contrasting 
outcomes of the protest movements.  
For instance, numerous research inquiries have revolved around trying to 
understand the reasons why the transition to democracy proved more successful in 
Tunisia than in Egypt as they each have a shared history of maintaining a secular order, 
similar population demographics with a Sunni Muslim majority and once the uprisings 
broke out, the military personnel in both countries each chose to back the protesters 
whilst abandoning their loyalty to the regime. Also, before the events of late 2010 
occurred, it may have appeared to the outside world that Egypt and Tunisia, although 
well-known autocracies, were at least governed by more liberal constitutions that 
permitted multiparty elections and bestowed citizens with civil liberties. However, these 
images portrayed to the international community were merely cosmetic, as those rights 
were simply overturned by these regimes who then meticulously engineered their 
consolidation of power over the presidency and ruling parties.1 But now that an ample 
amount of time has passed since the protest movements erupted, key differences have 
been identified between the two countries which are thought to be the reasons behind 
Tunisia’s successful transition to democracy compared to its alleged counterpart, Egypt. 
The factors that are attributed to these disparate outcomes are the size and the role of the 
military in each country, in addition to the manner in which the incumbent regimes 
decided to treat Islamist groups enmeshed within the general public.2  In Tunisia, the 
military was purposely kept diminutive and frail unlike the highly populous Egyptian 
army that plays a significant role in society. Also, although both countries banned 
Islamist organizations from legally assembling, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was 
given more leeway to publicly gather and vie for seats in parliamentary elections, albeit 
as independents, whereas in Tunisia the law was strictly abided by and known Islamists 
 1 Leila Hilal, “Charting Transitions in the Middle East: Lessons Learned from Tunisia and Egypt,” Insight 
Turkey 14, no. 2 (2012): 2.   
  
2Paul Kubicek and Laura K. Landolt, “Opportunities and Constraints: Comparing Tunisia and Egypt to the 
Coloured Revolutions,” Democratization 21, no. 6 (2014): 989.  
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were completely suppressed or exiled.3  Therefore, during the transitional period in Egypt 
after Mubarak stepped down, the Islamists cozied up to the military who were in grave 
fear of loosing their entrenched role in the economy which prompted SCAF, the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces, to hijack the constitutional reform process to protect their 
monetary interests while simultaneously granting the Muslim Brotherhood exemption 
from the input of the secular oppositionists.4  Whereas the Islamist party in Tunisia, the 
Ennahda, were more eager and willing to work with civil society in ousting regime 
loyalists from participating in the process of restructuring the constitution which is cited 
as the reason why Tunisia has had a more successful transition to democracy than Egypt.  
 Another popular research topic pertains to the uprisings that occurred in Libya 
and Yemen, as scholars have focused their efforts on making sense of why NATO forces 
intervened in the former case but were absent in the latter despite all the similar features 
between these countries as well as their nearly identical responses towards brutally 
repressing the protest movements that took place within their borders. In both nations, 
rampant corruption is omnipresent, tribal affiliations are of utmost importance even 
taking precedence over religious and political propinquities and finally, citizens are 
presided over by nepotistic governing structures.5 In addition to this, the Libyan and 
Yemeni armed forces were instructed to blatantly slaughter unarmed citizens believed to 
be against the regime. But the United Nations Security Council only gave the go-ahead 
for NATO forces to actively intervene in Libya under the guise of “humanitarian 
intervention” to help protect civilians. Various speculations have attributed this decision 
to Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi’s overall unpopularity with a great number of 
world leaders who were eagerly awaiting his demise. Whereas in Yemen, the Saleh 
regime was viewed as an ally to the West and an avid supporter of the ‘war against 
terror’.6  Other studies have alluded to the presence of petroleum reserves as the real 
3Leila Hilal, “Charting Transitions in the Middle East: Lessons Learned from Tunisia and Egypt,” 3.  
  
4Michael Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring,” Democracy and Security 9, 
no. 4 (2013): 347.  
 
5Zoltan Barany, "The Role of the Military," Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 33. 
  
6Berdal Aral, “Roaring in Libya, Whispering in Others: UN Security Council’s Posture During the ‘Arab 
Spring’,” Insight Turkey 16, no. 1 (2014): 187.  
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reason why NATO decided to get involved in the domestic affairs of Libya, but not 
Yemen.  
 
Statement of the Problem                 
 One highly underexamined case is that of the unlikely pair, Bahrain and Syria. On 
the surface, comparing these countries based on their similarities may seem like a 
paradoxical task, but after thoroughly examining their attributes, they actually have more 
in common than what meets the eye. Both nations encompass specific qualities that 
substantially distinguish them from the rest of the countries engulfed by the Arab Spring. 
In short, Bahrain and Syria have highly heterogeneous populations that are split along 
ethnic and religious lines, both ruling regimes are minority groups challenged with 
governing over a dominant majority and finally, they each responded in a similar manner 
to the originally peaceful protests by briefly opting for mild concessions quickly followed 
by violent repression. Also, during the beginning months of the uprisings prominent 
external actors remained initially silent and unwilling to vehemently speak out against the 
atrocities being committed by the Bahraini and Syrian military forces against innocent, 
unarmed civilians legally exercising their right to protest.    
 But mentioning the role of external actors would not be complete without 
discussing the part played by the security apparatuses of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 
Bahrain’s uprising, as certain scholars have accredited their intervention as the sole 
reason why Bahrain was able to crush the momentum of the protest movements, but this 
is not the case. The 1,500-membered troop, comprised of men from the UAE’s military 
and the Saudi Arabian National Guard, was sent to Bahrain to provide the essential 
backbone needed to free-up the Bahraini Defense Forces from safeguarding important 
infrastructure so they could focus all their efforts on brutally repressing their own 
citizens.7 The coercive forces of the regime were the ones mercilessly striking 
demonstrators and eliminating them from the streets by any means possible. This is why 
the GCC intervention is not responsible for “saving” Bahrain from breakdown. At best, 
the crackdown on protesters might have taken a longer time without GCC support, but 
7Fawaz A. Gerges, ed. The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 337.  
 8 
                                                     
nonetheless the state still would have triumphed.8   
 For that reason, the empirical puzzle still remains as to why Bahrain was 
successful at quelling oppositional forces while Syria descended into the onset of civil 
war? 
 
Purpose of the Study          
 The purpose of this study is to uncover the causal mechanisms which are to blame 
for the drastically different outcomes in Bahrain and Syria.  Given their unique, shared 
country-specific characteristics, the identical responses they took against protesters and 
the similar reactions from the international community during the initial phases of the 
unrest, it seemed exceedingly probable to predict that the aftermath of the uprisings 
would have at least born a slight resemblance to one another. Since this has evidently not 
been the case, it makes for an interesting research opportunity to investigate how two 
highly overlooked factors, repression and signals, can impact whether or not a protest 
movement will result in civil war onset or not.  
 The decision to focus on the role of repression stems from the fact that only in 
Bahrain did this misuse of state power manage to subdue dissidents while in Syria it 
escalated the level of violence to the onset of civil war. Therefore, the specific types of 
repression tactics carried out must vary on certain aspects which produced these 
divergent outcomes. The reason for concentrating on signals, understood as statements of 
support or condemnation by external actors, has to do with the way  
in which they commented on the atrocities being committed by the state security forces in 
both countries. As the protest movements progressed, prominent foreign actors sent 
signals of support to the al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain while in Syria several denounced 
the behavior of the al-Assad administration and threatened to act if other nonviolent 
approaches were not adopted to mitigate the rising hostilities. These opposing reactions 
affected the strategic calculations of both opposition groups differently which made them 
either more eager or reluctant to resort to violent means to achieve their goals.  
 In order to address the reason why civil war broke out in Syria but not Bahrain, a 
comparative case study will be carried out to test for causation regarding the independent 
8Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform, 86, 90.  
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variable, repression,  as well as the intermediate variable, signals from external actors, to 
see if they had a deterring or escalatory effect on the protest movements which led to the 
absence or presence of civil war onset. 
 
Significance of the Study        
 This research is important because it will contribute to the civil war onset 
literature by analyzing the understudied roles that repression and signals play in 
influencing the likelihood that a country will descend into this type of intrastate conflict. 
By comparing the cases of Bahrain and Syria, it allows for a more comprehensive 
assessment of the impact that the independent variable of repression and intermediate 
variable of signals have on transforming protest movements into or away from the onset 
of civil war. Previous studies have assessed a multitude of diverse factors thought to play 
a part in the commencement of violence that ensues between a government and its 
domestic opposition.         
 The most generic explanations center around the greed versus grievance debate, 
as proponents of the former are more focused on the opportunity for rebellion whereas 
the latter emphasizes the level of citizen’s overall dissatisfaction with the state which 
propels people to take up arms against their government.  Another commonly cited factor 
thought to trigger civil war onset is the role of identity, but this has been rather difficult to 
prove empirically. Ethnicity and religious affiliation are the two most popular 
components of this umbrella term and although they are influential tools for mobilizing 
forces they have not been found to be the root cause of conflict. This is primarily because 
it is challenging to ascertain that a civil war occurred based purely on issues of identity, 
as the real cause is actually due to a shared struggle over a lack of specific socio-
economic resources which generates onset.  An additional trend has been to highlight 
certain attributes of a country that are believed to make them more susceptible to 
experiencing this kind of intrastate violence. Some popularly mentioned features are 
related to demographic factors such as population size or density, mountainous terrain 
and the presence of natural resources.  All of these aforementioned reasons represent the 
most generally cited factors thought to trigger civil war onset. Although these structural 
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models are useful for predicting which countries are more prone to civil war, they lack 
the ability to determine when this type of conflict will break out.  
 This thesis will take a process-oriented approach in understanding how the onset 
of civil war occurs by exemplifying how this type of intrastate conflict builds up through 
a dynamic interaction between a state, its dissidents and external actors to reach this 
threshold of violence. Analyzing these lesser known causal mechanisms of repression and 
signals hopes to provide policymakers with the tools necessary for better predicting 
when, and not simply where, hostilities in a specific country are in danger of escalating to 
the onset of civil war.   
 Repression is a vital independent variable to study because whenever a 
government perceives a challenge to its authority they are likely to respond with 
oppressive measures against their adversaries. This is known as the “Law of Coercive 
Responsiveness” which almost guarantees that a regime will react to an emerging 
uprising with violent force. What is interesting though is that, historically, the use of state 
repression has led to mixed results, as in some instances it was successful at defeating the 
opposition while in others it accelerated the violence to the onset of civil war. Therefore, 
it is crucial to understand that state repression is not a homogenous type of behavior but 
rather one that entails multiple forms of coercion which have a varying impact on the 
outcome of protest movements. Investigating the multiple varieties of repression will 
pinpoint the types which are responsible for increasing or decreasing the momentum of 
uprisings.  
 The other fundamental intermediate variable that will be examined are signals 
which will be defined as statements made by external actors. Signals are important 
factors to pay attention to because they reveal extremely telling messages to governments 
and their domestic opponents as to what side should except to receive foreign support if 
the conflict metastasized into a civil war. Previous research has tended to treat this type 
of internal violence as purely domestic in nature, neglecting the transnational dynamics 
that play a crucial role in effecting the direction of protests. Although signals from 
external actors will vary based on the type and target of repression tactics being carried 
out, they still contribute to causing a variation in the dependent variable which is the 
presence or absence of civil war onset. In addition, assessing the role of signals will allow 
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international relations scholarship to be applied to intrastate conflict studies to offer a 
more in-depth conception of how third-parties can influence the direction of protest 
movements into or away from civil war onset.   
 
Primary Research Question                 
 To reiterate, the primary research question that will be addressed in this thesis, is 
what were the specific causal mechanisms that resulted in the different outcomes of the 
Arab Spring uprisings that took place in Bahrain and Syria?                   
 
Hypotheses            
 The first hypothesis is that the differences in the type and target of repression are 
the reasons why the Bahraini regime was able to quell dissidents while the Syrian forces 
only upped the level of mobilization throughout the entire country resulting in the onset 
of civil war.  
 The second hypothesis is that the specific type and target of repression caused a 
variation in the signals from external actors, determining if they were sent in support of 
the regime or its opposition which influenced both parties’ decision making processes in 
deciding to come to mutual agreements or opt for incurring the costs of going to war with 
one another. 
                       
Research Design  
 The methodology that will be used in testing these two hypotheses is a 
comparative case study of the uprisings that occurred in Bahrain and Syria during the 
timeframe of January 2011 to January 2012. The decision to compare only these two 
cases was due to the fact that no other Arab Spring countries exhibited the unique 
attributes as the ones found in Bahrain and Syria which provided a rare opportunity to 
examine the highly understudied roles of repression and signals from external actors. 
Although the comparative case study approach is constrained by the “many variables 
small N” problem, if properly applied it can compete with rival methods. The most 
similar systems design is used to match Bahrain and Syria based on all the important 
common features they share which are not central to this study, in effect controlling for 
them and thus reducing the many variables issue. This technique has an advantage over 
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large-N, cross-case methodologies where each and every single relevant control variable 
is assigned a precise ranking commonly based on strong assumptions regarding the 
underlying causal relationship.9   
 Material from primary source data will be critically analyzed and compared 
against one another to test the hypotheses in order to see if the independent variable of 
repression and the intermediate variable of signals have explanatory power in accounting 
for the different outcomes of the uprisings that took place in Bahrain and Syria. The 
resources explicitly concerning the repression tactics of both regimes will be obtained 
through country-specific reports on Bahrain and Syria from the Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, the UN 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and the U.S. State Department 
during the timeframe from January 2011 until January 2012. In addition, datasets from 
the Political Terror Scale’s archives, which measures the level of state violence, will be 
used as well.  
 The type of signals to be examined are formal statements made by external actors 
and international organizations that proclaimed either their support or condemnation of 
the regimes or their opposition that will be obtained through textual documents, country-
specific reports, public speeches and adopted resolutions or attempted resolutions.  These 
groups consist of one intergovernmental organization, the United Nations, two regional 
organizations, the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council and one 
governmental organization, the U.S. State Department. Also, statements from two of the 
most powerful heads of state during this timeframe, current President of the United 
States, Barack Obama and former King of Saudi Arabia, the late Abdullah bin Abdulaziz 
Al Saud, will be analyzed because of the critical role they played in shaping the direction 
of the uprising through their vocal declarations which either supported or denounced the 
Bahraini and Syrian regimes or their opposition.  
 The signals from external actors in Iran and Russia are not included in this 
analysis for several reasons. The first is that the Russian regime basically did not 
acknowledge or even bother to really comment on the situation in Bahrain and Iran 
9John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 131-133.  
 13 
                                                     
eventually followed suit in favor of focusing their attention on the Syrian uprising 
instead. Therefore, the signals each country made about Bahrain had relatively little 
impact on the direction of the protest movement in this country. In Syria on the other 
hand, they were the only two staunch supporters of the al-Assad regime who wanted to 
see Bashar remain in power but were significantly undermined by the rest of the 
international communities’ efforts which signaled to the oppositional forces that they had 
a plethora of outside supporters that would aid them should the situation continue to 
escalate. This is why although the Iranian and Syrian regimes sent costly pro-government 
signals in the forms of monetary aid and arms shipment that, according to signaling 
theory, should cause dissidents to back down and refrain from further conflict with the 
state, was not the case because they were outnumber by almost all states in the 
international system who were adamantly against the Syrian regime and continued to up 
the number of cheap anti-government signals that overpowered the costly signals from 
these two countries.  
 
Theoretical Framework          
 The foundational theories used to guide the direction of this research are 
escalation and signaling theory. They were chosen because they yield greater explanatory 
power in demonstrating how the roles of repression and signals can influence and cause 
civil war onset to ensue compared to other theoretical perspectives more focused on 
greed versus grievance type factors. Within escalation theory lies the inflammation 
hypothesis which predicts that civil war onset is the result of the specific type and 
intensity of the repression tactics carried out by the state which mobilizes citizens to up 
their rebellious efforts.10  By responding to initially nonviolent movements with violent 
force the state causes its dissidents to view normal channels for initiating political change 
as closed while simultaneously increasing their grievances and thus, their willingness to 
fight. Therefore, repression is an intricate element that is enmeshed in the multifaceted 
process leading to the onset of civil war which should not be ignored. The key to 
10Armstrong II, David A., Christian Davenport and Mark I. Lichbach, "Conflict Escalation and the Origins 
of Civil War" (Working Paper, University of Maryland, 2006), 35, 36. 
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understanding how this type of intrastate violence emerges lies within identifying the 
escalatory path which leads from one form of conflict to the next. Moving on to the 
second framework, signaling theory places an emphasis on the often overlooked 
transnational features that can influence whether or not a country will descend into civil 
war onset. When foreign actors make simple statements showing their support or 
disproval of a regime or its opposition based on their actions towards one another, it 
affects the decision making processes of both parties in deciding whether or not to come 
to a mutual agreement to end the rising tensions or opt for resorting to continued violence 
instead.11 
 
Limitations 
 Since it is nearly impossible to apply a strict application of the most similar 
systems design, as it would require that cases be selected based on a specified number of 
factors that only varied in their outcome and one single explanatory variable, which is 
why a looser application of this was employed when choosing to compare Bahrain and 
Syria. Despite not being able to systematically match the cases on all the relevant control 
variables, it still permits for a thorough examination to be conducted to see if a causal 
relationship exists between the independent and dependent variables. 
 
Delimitations 
 This study is solely focused on the uprisings that occurred in Bahrain and Syria 
during the timeframe from January 2011 until January 2012 because it was within this 
period that the protest movements were either successfully defeated or the onset of civil 
war had begun. Limiting this study to one year instead of stretching it out over a five-year 
span will provide more informative data on how repression and signals from external 
actors caused the varying outcomes in each country. Furthermore, the decision for using 
these two factors as the casual mechanisms thought to shape the way protest movements 
will turn out is because several other explanatory variables have been constantly 
reproduced in multiple studies leading to relatively similar conclusions. The cases of 
11Clayton Lynn Thyne, "Cheap Signals, Costly Consequences: How International Relations Affect Civil 
Conflict" (PhD. dissertation, University of Iowa, 2007), 30-38.  
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Bahrain and Syria were chosen based on the several shared country-specific 
characteristics that they both exhibit, such as their highly heterogeneous populations and 
the fact that both regimes are minority groups governing over a dominant majority, which 
made them unique compared to the rest of the Arab Spring countries. Also, the manner in 
which they both responded to the originally nonviolent protests with brutal repression and 
the initial reluctance of the international community to publically condemn the barbarities 
being committed made them an even better case for comparison to understand how the 
aftermath of both uprisings have led to the completely different situations each country is 
in today.           
 
Definition of Terms         
 Although the onset of civil war is difficult to operationalize, for the purpose of 
this thesis specific criteria will be used in order to attempt to give it a more concrete 
definition. One of the first factors is that an armed conflict must take place in a country 
with a minimum population of 500,000 between the national government and at least one 
insurgency group. Secondly, effective resistance by both sides is a must and the anti-
regime rebels must be militarily organized as well as having publically stated political 
aspirations.12 But one of the biggest problems in determining when the onset of civil war 
occurs is related to the specific death threshold that must be exceeded for a conflict to be 
labeled as such. An additional problem arises in regards to whether or not only battle-
related deaths should be included or if civilian casualties should be counted as well.  
 The standard model for measuring the intensity of internal conflict focuses on the 
total number of deaths to see if it exceeds a specific threshold, normally 1,000 casualties 
in a given year, as another vital factor that determines when the onset of civil war occurs. 
But using the absolute number of deaths instead of the number of casualties standardized 
by population size biases findings against conflicts in smaller nations as this threshold is 
applied to countries whose population sizes are extremely heterogeneous.13  Therefore, 
12 Nicholas Sambanis, “What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational 
Definition,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): 816.  
 
13 Hannes Mueller, “Growth and Violence: Argument for a Per Capita Measure of Civil War” (Working 
Paper Series, no. 756, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, 2014), 2.  
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although this method shows the correlation between the structural characteristics of 
countries and the onset of civil war,  it does not accurately capture the specific country-
by-country variations that might lead to onset in certain cases. As a solution to this 
problem, using the number of deaths in relation to the population size of a country during 
a one-year period would capture the violence intensity in casualties per capita instead of 
the absolute number of overall deaths. This would make it less likely to overlook armed 
conflicts taking place in smaller nations that produce fewer deaths but are nonetheless 
dramatically significant.14 But establishing a proper per capita measure is difficult and 
labor intensive.  
 Therefore, the death threshold that must be exceeded in Bahrain is relaxed to 25 
battle-related and civilian casualties in a given year while in Syria it is increased to 1,000 
to better accurately account for the variance in their population sizes. Although Bahrain’s 
population is only 600,000 while Syria’s is 22 million, it is still possible to compare these 
countries and see if the death thresholds in each amount to the number needed to be 
labeled as the onset of civil war. Now although the Bahraini Independent Commission of 
Inquiry recorded 35 deaths during the uprising starting from February 14, 2011 until 
April 15, 2011 in which 18 civilian deaths were attributed to security forces, 1 police 
officer death was attributed to the Bahraini Defense Force, 3 security force member 
deaths were attributed to demonstrators and 8 civilian deaths were not attributable to any 
specific perpetrator, it does still not qualify as the onset of civil war.15 This is because it 
does not meet the other criteria previously mentioned above, such as the fact that an 
armed insurgency group must have formed and been actively engaged in violent conflict 
with the state. While in Syria, towards the the last few months of the uprising, the Free 
Syrian Army was established which actively and effectively targeted members of the 
Syrian regime’s security forces, killing a significant amount of them. By the end of 
December 2011, the death toll was estimated around 5,000 which included members from 
 
14 Ibid, 11-12.  
 
15 15 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of 
Inquiry (Presented in Manama, Bahrain, November 23, 2011), 220.   
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the regime’s security forces and insurgents caused by battle-related death in addition to 
civilian casualties as well. Therefore, although the international community did not 
immediately declare the situation in Syria as a civil war, does not mean that it did not 
begin during this timeframe.  
 
Overview of Chapters to Come       
 This thesis will consist of six main chapters. In Chapter 2, a review of the 
literature will be presented to show how previous researchers have used other variables in 
their efforts towards explaining how the onset of civil war occurs. A more focused 
examination will be given to the literature that is more relevant in regards to the 
independent and intermediate variables of repression and signals. Chapter 3 will consist 
of a detailed description of the theoretical perspectives adopted followed by a discussion 
of the methodology and research design which will include how the data was collected, 
defined and analyzed. Chapters 4 will be solely dedicated to the information on Bahrain 
while Chapter 5 will be designated exclusively for the material found on Syria. Finally, 
Chapter 6 will provide a brief overview of the entire thesis, a few concluding remarks 
about the level of success of the study and future recommendations for upcoming 
scholars interested in understanding the causes of civil war onset.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 In the post-WWII era, civil wars have become the most common type of conflict 
occurring in more than 70 countries since 1945 and lasting on average for a period longer 
than seven years.16 This type of intrastate violence that takes place between a government 
and at least one opposition group has detrimental, long-lasting effects on the wellbeing of 
a country and its people. The direct consequences can be seen in rising death tolls of 
civilians, through the destruction of infrastructure and arable land while future effects 
will likely result in a decline in foreign investment and economic growth, in addition to 
the enduring psychological impact on citizens living in these unfortunate conditions. But 
civil wars do not only effect the internal dynamics of a state, as the influx of refugees in 
surrounding countries can create severe, problematic situations for host nations as they 
may not be financially quipped to house over a specified number of people within their 
borders. Also, the probability that refugees will become stricken with communicable 
diseases significantly increases due to their poor living conditions and lack of access to 
food or water which creates another risk that neighboring countries must endure.17 
According to the United Nations Human Rights Council, by the end of 2006, the number 
of people they had listed under the moniker, “persons of concern” (which included 
refugees and internally displaced persons) almost hit the 33 million mark, an outstanding 
number to say the least.18  
 
Why the topic is important 
 Understanding the causes leading to the onset of civil war is imperative because 
of the devastating consequences they have domestically as well as the security threat they 
pose to nearby countries. Their destructive nature and inherent persistence overtime 
throughout various states has led scholars to vigorously study the causal mechanisms that 
produce this type of intrastate conflict. Therefore, it is important to continue to carry out 
16 Stergios Skaperdas, “The Costs of Organized Violence: A Review of the Evidence” (CESifo Working 
Paper Series No. 2704, July 2009). 
 
17 Hazem Adam Ghobarah, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “The Post-War Public Health Effects of Civil 
Conflict,” Social Sciences and Medicines 59, no. 4 (2005): 870.  
 
18 Stergios Skaperdas, “The Costs of Organized Violence: A Review of the Evidence” (CESifo Working 
Paper Series No. 2704, July 2009). 
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these analytical investigations to garner a more comprehensive understanding of the 
multiple causes thought to trigger civil war onset with the hopes of preventing these 
situations in the future.  
 
The Purpose of the Literature Review  
 After the Cold War, a surge in studies regarding the onset, duration and outcome 
of civil war were guided by new theoretical perspectives that were all tested using 
different empirical designs which claimed to hold the answers as to why countries 
become engulfed in internal warfare. Due to the multitude of variables that were put forth 
during this period, it is beneficial to have a solid background knowledge about these 
various explanations. This review will therefore highlight the most commonly cited 
theories and their approaches towards testing them empirically. It will then exemplify 
how studying the highly overlooked factors of repression and signals from external actors 
will fill a gap in the literature. 
 
Scope of the review  
 This review will focus specifically on the civil war onset literature while 
disregarding other work more focused on explaining the duration and outcome of civil 
war. It will be organized thematically based on the prominent theoretical perspectives 
that have shaped the way people understand and study civil war today.  
 
Organizational Pattern of the Review       
 The first theoretical frameworks that will be discussed are the ones which initially 
paved the way for civil war onset scholars. Although they have largely been discredited 
now, it is vital to know the history of how the current literature came to be. Therefore, a 
brief overview of greed and grievance theories will be reviewed to emphasize how they 
were more fixated on using structural characteristics to explain the onset of civil war. 
Then it will transition over to newer work dedicated to showing how repression and 
transnational features can also produce this type of intrastate conflict as well. 
 
Causes of Civil War Onset  
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Grievance Theories 
 Throughout the number of grievance-based theories regarding the onset of civil 
war, the fundamental message of them all is that when citizens become so discontent with 
the unjust polices of the government they decide to mobilize and take up arms against the 
state in order to initiate their desired changes. One of the earliest theories of this kind 
dates back to the 1970s with Ted Gurr’s relative deprivation theory. He developed this 
concept when he was attempting to address the reason why men rebel. According to him 
it is through a three-stage process in which political violence ensues. The beginning 
phase occurs when citizens start to acquire extreme dissatisfactions with the state and 
overtime these frustrations eventually morph into highly politicized issues. This is the 
tipping point that engenders citizens to engage in violent confrontations with the regime. 
The root source of these grievances stem from what Gurr terms, ‘relative deprivation’, 
defined as “a perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value 
capabilities”.19  In other words, when a person feels robbed of something in which they 
believe they are entitled to over others who already possess whatever that something may 
be, they are experiencing feelings of relative deprivation.  
 Another more recently developed grievance-based theory which furthers Gurr’s 
position is that put forth by Frances Stewart in his research on horizontal inequalities and 
civil war onset. He defines horizontal inequalities as disparities that exist among 
culturally-defined groups that provoke people to rally against the state to change the 
specific policies in place that negatively impacting their lives. Although Stewart is 
cognizant that inherent cultural differences alone are not enough to initiate this kind of 
violent outbreak as his theory acknowledges that when fighting occurs along ethnic lines 
the underlying reasons can almost always be reduced to inequalities that exist in the 
distribution of economic, political and/or social power.20  Racial, religious, ethnic and 
even immigrant categories are classified under the umbrella term of ‘culturally-defined 
groups’ which may feel the impact of these horizontal inequalities. In the economic 
sense, these inequities can be found in the differences of income or employment 
19 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 13. 
 
20 Frances Stewart, “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities,” Oxford Development Studies 28, 
no. 2 (2000): 247-248. 
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opportunities, in the social realm as disparities in the accessibility to various public 
services and in the political sphere as a lack of entryway into any government position of 
power. The onset of civil war will occur when these culturally-defined group identities 
coincide with the perceived inequalities that they harbor towards one another which 
mobilizes them to forcefully unite against the regime.21   
  These two grievance-based theories that were built on the concepts of relative 
deprivation and horizontal inequalities helped pave the way for civil war onset studies 
because they identified some of the reasons why citizens would opt for engaging in 
violent combat with the state due to their perceived injustices. But the studies that have 
been conducted on their behalf are measuring levels of actual inequalities that exist, 
while these theories specifically state that people decide to go to war with the state based 
on their own perceptions of inequality and their relative position towards others in 
society, rather than on actual observed measures of inequality. It is extremely difficult to 
collect, measure and conceptualize citizen’s perceived grievances which is why these 
types of theories have lost their prominence in the field today. 
 
Greed Theories  
 Civil war onset theories that are founded on the idea of greed as a motivating 
factor, posit that this type of intrastate conflict will occur when rebels’ perceived benefits 
are greater than the costs of rebelling against the state. Greed-proponents have measured 
these concepts in a number of various ways, but this review will only focus on the 
research conducted by two of the most well-known experts on the topic, Paul Collier and 
Anke Hoeffler, whose main goal is to illustrate that greed or economic-based factors 
elicit civil war onset not citizen’s grievances. In their studies, the cost of rebellion, 
probability of successful rebellion and benefits of rebellion are all proxied by numerous 
variables in order to draw inferences about the rebels’ expected behavior and motives.22  
 For potential rebels, the cost of rebellion is determined by two factors, the first 
being how much income they would loose if they decided to go to war which is proxied 
by the current per capita income of the state. The second aspect pertains to the costs of 
21 Ibid, 246.  
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coordination as secrecy and trust are necessary conditions when plotting a rebellion and 
these are measured by population size and cultural distinctness which proxied by ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, the likelihood that two randomly selected people in a country 
will be from different ethnic groups. The likelihood that rebels are victorious hinges on 
the governments capacity to defend itself, in other words, on the extent of their military 
expenditure that is determined by the size of its taxable base which is then, in turn, 
proxied again by per capita income and natural resource endowments, calculated by the 
share of primary exports in the GDP.23 The outcomes of a successful rebellion will result 
in either a complete takeover of the state or secession from it (the desire to secede is 
proxied by population size). If the former takes place, then the expected benefits of 
rebellion lie in the capacity of the new rebel government to repay their supporters which 
is proxied yet again by the taxable capacity of the current regime in power. But if the 
latter situation transpires, then the taxable base of the pre-secession state is not the right 
basis for the future benefits of rebellion as distributional considerations become more 
crucial instead.24         
 The results indicated that four factors were central in predicting the onset of civil 
war. Higher per capita income reduced the probability that this type of intrastate violence 
would occur as rebels would be disinclined to sacrifice lager wages to engage in combat 
against the state, especially since the duration of any conflict remains unknown. The 
presence of natural resources increased the likelihood of onset, but after a certain 
threshold, reduced the chances of it. Although, the authors claimed that the overall effect 
of having natural resources was more of a burden than a blessing, except in rare instances 
in which a country can avoid rebellion through monetary concessions only made possible 
by the exceedingly high amount of rents they receive from their abundant natural 
resources. The next finding was that countries with larger populations were more at risk 
for experiencing a civil war and this was attributed to greater desires for secession. While 
the authors did point out that this finding may be open to interpretation as population size 
was also used to proxy coordination costs, they simply stated that aspirations for 
23 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 50 
(1998): 566. 
 
24 Ibid, 563.  
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secession predominate. Finally, the effect of ethno-linguistic fractionalization was 
measured and the results were different from the initial prediction which assumed that 
higher levels would increase the prospects for civil war onset. Instead, this did not have 
any effect on the likelihood that this kind of domestic conflict would ensue as countries 
with almost complete homogeneous societies and ones with highly fractionalized 
populations showed no probable indication that this would increase or decrease their 
chances for experiencing a civil war. Rather, what was shown to increase a country’s risk 
for incurring a civil war was not ethno-linguistic fractionalization per se, but the degree 
of that fractionalization which facilitates rebel coordination.25      
 In order to test the explanatory power that greed-based theories hold in predicting 
the onset of civil war, researchers must first identify quantifiable variables for 
opportunity. Sometimes this task is relatively straightforward, for example, if one wanted 
to measure the levels of economic inequality that exist within a country, they could use 
the GINI coefficient of income which shows how income is distributed throughout a 
nation’s population. But several variables cannot be measured this easily which forces 
researchers to use calculable proxies instead and this becomes very problematic down the 
line. First off, certain proxies that are intended to represent the opportunity for rebellion 
can just as easily be used as indicators of grievance. Greed-based theories state that rebel 
recruits must be compensated and this compensation has to be greater than their income 
foregone when they decided to quit their jobs and enlist as rebels. Therefore, rebellions 
are believed to occur when foregone income is remarkable low but this could also be 
interpreted as an objective economic grievance.26 Secondly, most of what they are trying 
to measure is really not being measured at all by the specific proxy variables they chose 
and thus, it becomes very difficult to decipher what they are actually capturing instead. 
For instance, the presence of natural resources are thought to increase the chances that a 
country will experience a civil war as they provide potential rebels with the opportunity 
for extortion. In reality, this is not based on concrete, observable data regarding rebel 
25 Ibid, 569.  
 
26 Laurie Nathan, “The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics: A Critique of Collier and Hoeffler on 
Causes of Civil War” (Discussion Paper no. 11, Crisis States Research Center, University of Cape Town, 
South Africa, 2005), 4.  
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behavior but simply inferred from a mere correlation between primary commodity 
exports to GDP and civil war onset.27  The problem with greed-based theories is that they 
are essentially going around in circles as they are predicated around assumptions of 
rebels’ behavior and motives which are then identified by structural indicators and 
quantifiable proxies that are statistically analyzed along with the occurrence of civil wars 
in which once again new assumptions are made about rebel’s behavior and motives. This 
makes their variables of interest lack true explanatory power as they do not accurately 
identify any real causal mechanisms that can trigger the onset of civil war. Although, 
these theories are still useful in providing information about the structural characteristics 
of a country that can increase their chances of experiencing a civil war in the future, such 
as having a large population, low levels of per capita income or abundant natural 
resources, to name a few.  
 The literature needs an in-depth exploration into other causal relationships that 
exist between certain understudied variables and the probability of civil war onset which 
are not related to the structural characteristics of a country or citizen’s grievances. 
Examining the roles of repression and signals from external actors will help fill this gap. 
 
Repression Theories  
 Repression-based theories bring something new to the literature which has been 
predominately overwhelmed by structuralist accounts of civil war onset that center 
around the notion that these types of conflicts simply “break out”.28 Other researchers are 
starting to take a process-oriented approach towards the study of civil war onset which 
suggests that conflicts of this magnitude must build up over a period of time through an 
ever-changing interaction of violence between a state and its dissidents. The use of state 
repression is said to be the key in uncovering when this sort of intrastate conflict will 
occur based on micro-level units of observation between a regime and the oppositional 
forces against it which adds a temporal dynamic to the literature that was previously only 
27 Ibid, 2.  
 
28 Joseph K. Young. “Antecedents of Civil War Onset: Greed, Grievance and State Repression,” in What 
Do We Know About Civil War?, edited by David Mason and Sara Mitchell (New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield, forthcoming), 2.  
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able to predict where conflict was likely to erupt.29  Within studies of civil war, there are 
several competing theories all attempting to explain exactly how repression causes onset.  
 One particular study conducted by Nicolas Rost attempts to show how human 
rights violations can lead to onset of intrastate violence. He defines human rights 
violations in terms of infringements by the state on its citizens’ personal integrity rights 
which are specifically listed as instances of torture, political imprisonment, 
“disappearances”, and extrajudicial killings. These variables are tested in multivariate 
models to assess their influence on the likelihood of civil war onset.30  But what he is 
particularly interested in is linking state weakness to a higher probability that a state will 
use violent repression tactics against its dissidents. Indiscriminate repression is said to 
cause civil war onset and be used more by weak states for several reasons. Since these 
countries have little resources, their police forces are highly inadequate and therefore 
they have trouble collecting intelligence to carry out targeted repression on those directly 
involved in rebelling against the state. Also, they may not have the economic resources to 
accommodate opposition’s demands and since they do not want to appear even weaker 
than what they already are, they opt for indiscriminate repression.31 The general 
conclusion was that when state weakness and human rights violations are both present in 
a country the risk of civil war onset is extremely high. The idea is that when weak states 
use indiscriminate violence it leads to civil war because it drives civilians into the arms of 
rebel forces, giving them the strength they need to cause a noteworthy level of damage to 
the regime. But the author acknowledges that these types of repression tactics may simply 
be a strategy used by governments to respond to a rebel group, meaning that repression is 
merely a part of the escalatory process leading to civil war and not the sole cause for it. 
 This research was beneficial to the literature because it addressed the concept that 
certain aspects of repression such as the type being carried out may increase the 
likelihood of civil war onset, especially in weak states. The problem is that repression 
was treated as both the cause of civil war and as part of the process leading up to it. 
29 Ibid, 2.  
 
30 Nicolas Rost, “Human Rights Violations, Weak States, and Civil War,” Human Rights Review 12, no. 
196 (2011): 418. 
 
31 Ibid, 422-423.  
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Further investigations are needed to address the endogeneity issues that arose when 
studying repression’s impact on the risk of civil war onset that will be able to prove 
causation and not just correlation. It remains a difficult task to pinpoint the exact causal 
mechanism linking these two together, especially when dealing with large-N empirical 
models. Comparative case studies can offer a better insight into this relationship as they 
can meticulously trace the process of conflict escalation from minor struggles to all-out 
civil war.                     
 Now although the previous study recognized that civil war was a process of 
interactions between the state and its dissidents in which indiscriminate repression led to 
onset, the decision for using this specific type of repression method was based on 
structural characteristics of a state. Weak states were supposedly more likely to use 
indiscriminate repression because they lacked the intelligence required to carry out 
targeted attacks and the resources needed to accommodate the opposition’s demands.32 
But research conducted by Joseph K. Young attempted to tackle the question as to why 
some weak states have never experienced a civil war while others have. He proposed a 
new conceptualization to measure state capacity which included the level of societal 
support in addition to the amount of resources a state has in determining whether or not 
repression will be used on dissidents and civilians. Both studies assume that repression 
causes civil war but the decision of leaders to use it are based on different factors. Also, 
the former study was more focused on the idea of state weakness and it did not include a 
comprehensive description of the process of violence that occurs between states and its 
dissidents. The model proposed by Young aimed to clarify this by emphasizing the 
micro-foundational motives of the state, civilians and dissidents which leads to civil war 
onset.33           
 States, as rational actors, try to use the least costly actions to ensure they remain 
in power while still receiving support from the majority of the population. But when 
32 Nicolas Rost, “Human Rights Violations, Weak States, and Civil War,” Human Rights Review 12, no. 
196 (2011): 422. 
33 Joseph K. Young, “Repression, Dissent, and the Onset of Civil War,” Political Research Quarterly 66, 
no. 3 (2013): 517.  
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leaders are concerned about their job security they will use repression to elicit greater 
compliance with their preferred policies and to quell any behavioral challenges to their 
authority.34  In reality, this has a backlash effect as the more a state uses repression the 
less societal support it receives which in turn causes a rise in dissident activity. Dissidents 
can engage in a number of tactics to protest against the unjust policies of the state, such 
as demonstrations or any kind of violent disruptions that directly oppose the regime. The 
more dissident activity there is the more a state will up the level of brutal repression and 
this is how the process of violent interactions is established that will eventually lead to 
civil war onset. Therefore, this can explain the reason why some weak states never 
experience civil war because they have high levels of societal support which reduces the 
need for them to use repression to carry out their polices.35      
 This research added to the literature a theory of how the process of interactions 
between a state and its dissidents could progress into violent confrontations. Although 
former studies linking repression to civil war onset all believed that civil wars occurred 
through a process of violence they did not directly identify how the course of this 
relationship changed overtime leading to civil war onset. By adding the concepts of 
societal support and a leader’s job insecurity as the causal mechanisms that influence a 
leader’s decision to use repression or not filled this gap. But it becomes problematic 
when trying to measure these concepts as they cannot precisely be quantified so proxy 
variables are needed instead. Societal support was measured according to the term 
relative political capacity which is supposed to capture a state’s capabilities to collect 
resources and control society. But in certain highly repressive regimes, governments face 
no difficulties in collecting taxes, implementing their policies and maintaining order. To 
truly measure societal support, opinions of citizens are needed to accurately assess the 
level of support a regime has not through proxy variables. Job insecurity which attempts 
to depict the likelihood that a leader will remain in power is calculated based on the time 
former executives were in office and on the rate of economic growth. But these measures 
also cannot adequately be used as substitutes for a leader’s feelings on whether or not 
34 Ibid, 519.  
 
35 Ibid, 524.  
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their position in office is in jeopardy. Lastly, to test these theories a quantitative analysis 
was applied in which the spatial domain was across 162 countries, making it extremely 
difficult to actually assess the process of violence that occurs between a state and its 
dissidents in such a large number of cases, especially using statistical analysis. It would 
be better to critically examine these theories using only a few countries in order to see if 
the level of societal support and job insecurity have explanatory power.                
 Prior studies have all agreed upon the notion that increased state repression leads 
dissidents to up their rebellious efforts thus causing civil war onset, except they all had 
their own mechanisms to determine whether or not a state would use violent force. But 
newer work claims that escalation has been indirectly measured and only considered in 
isolation from other accelerating processes that can also cause civil war onset. Also, these 
studies are trying to stress the importance of where protests occur as this can produce a 
different escalatory process and elicit varying responses from a regime. One study by 
David Armstrong II and Christian Davenport puts forth three hypotheses regarding 
escalation processes that can all lead to civil war onset and which have largely been 
ignored in previous work.  
 The first hypothesis is the one most cited in studies of repression’s impact on civil 
war onset, the inflammation hypothesis, which claims that civil wars occur because state 
repression triggers dissidents to up their violent efforts. The incapacity hypothesis says 
that when a state cannot successfully apply repression, dissidents will mobilize at an 
increasing rate leading to civil war onset because the weakness of the regime presents 
them with the opportunity for rebellion. In this sense, the level of repression is believed 
to be the best way to measure this opportunity structure because of the direct effects it has 
on citizens and upcoming protest movements. Lastly, the ineffectiveness hypothesis 
states that civil wars occur when state repression has no deterring effect on dissidents as 
they perceive the state to be weak despite the fact that they are sustaining the costs of 
using brutal force, dissidents still continue to up their level of violent activity. In addition 
to this, the study proclaims that it is not just the kind of dissent that occurs, such as 
nonviolent or violent uprisings, but the locale of this activity as well. They distinguish 
this to mean areas where low-level conflict occurs in the pre-civil war period that takes 
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place in either rural areas or urban ones.36  According to them, special attention needs to 
be paid to the various strategies adopted by dissidents because it has relevance for 
existing theory and can effect how states interact with them depending on their preferred 
tactics of rebellion. Dissidents in the rural country side are thought to use more guerilla 
warfare type strategies to topple the regime while those in urban areas are said to resort to 
anti-government protests instead.                 
 To test these theories, they examined 149 countries over a span of around 24 
years using statistical analysis to see if the three escalatory processes for onset could all 
be observed.  They operationalized their variables for the concepts of inflammation, 
ineffectiveness and incapability. The level of repression was based on the political terror 
scale measures and thought to represent the inflammation hypothesis. The guerilla war 
variable simply stood for whether or not the presence of this type of activity was present 
in previous years and represented the concept of incapability. Lastly, the ineffectiveness 
hypothesis was operationalized as a variable for increased dissent proxied by rises in the 
level of anti-government demonstrations or riots. They then measured the levels of 
repression, dissent and guerrilla war in the previous four years in the countries that 
experienced a civil war. Although their efforts were amicable it is difficult to 
operationalize such concepts of inflammation, ineffectiveness and incapability. Simply 
because a government does not choose to use repression against protestors does not 
necessarily mean that they are incapable of doing so. Also, it does not directly measure 
the precise actions taken by dissidents and regimes that would show in greater depth how 
the process of escalation occurs. It assumed that those in the countryside were using 
guerilla warfare tactics while those in the city took to the streets in protest, but this is not 
always the case. Repression may not always be the best way to assess the political 
opportunity structure because certain regimes will choose to respond to protestors in a 
nonviolent fashion and accommodate the desires of the opposition. Lastly, there was no 
distinction made on whether or not the repression carried out by the state was on civilians 
or combatants, which is a crucial component to be aware of when studying the effects of 
36 David Armstrong II and Christian Davenport, “From Mountains to Movements: Dissent, Repression and 
Escalation to Civil War” (Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference in 
San Diego, CA, March, 2006).  
 30 
                                                     
repression on civil war onset.  
 Viewing civil war onset as a process of state and dissident interactions has led to 
two competing theories within studies assessing the role of repression and protest 
movements. One set of scholars treat state repression as an independent variable and 
examine its impact on rebellion and domestic conflicts. The other group considers 
repression as the dependent variable in which states will apply it once protests and 
uprisings start becoming more violent and widespread.37  In reality, any observable 
outcomes of domestic conflict ranging from peaceful negotiations, to successful 
deterrence or increasing levels of violence are determined by the actions of the 
government. If a state chooses to repress an upcoming protest movement, it is based on 
their presumption that it is easier to suppress lower levels of conflict before they reach 
higher stages of violent activity.38  The problem with this is that the use of state 
repression on protest movements have led to mixed results in the literature, as in certain 
instances it has proven to be an effective deterring mechanism while in other cases it has 
escalated violence to the level of civil war onset. The question then, needs to be reframed 
to not focus on whether or not repression has the capacity to quell oppositionists or 
radicalize them, as it has the capacity to do both, but rather under what conditions does it 
produce these different outcomes.39  This is where it becomes critical to determine who 
the protestors are and what strategies they are employing to achieve their desired policy 
outcomes. If a government decides to resort to repression, it is important to be aware of 
the specific tactics they use against dissidents as this has a direct impact on either 
increasing or decreasing the escalation to civil war onset.  
 Protestors are ever-changing their strategies in response to the governments 
actions towards them.  At first, repression of oppositionists may be effective but only up 
until a certain threshold in which higher and higher levels of repression will actually 
37 Sabine C. Carey, “The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression,” Political Research 
Quarterly 59, no.1 (2006): 3.  
 
38 Jan Henryk Pierskalla, “Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government 
Repression,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 1 (2010): 121-125.   
 
39 Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl, “Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest,” Social 
Forces 69, no. 2 (1990): 523.   
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become counterproductive for the regime.40  If nonviolent protestors are brutally targeted 
by their government then this will decrease the level of the groups nonviolent activity, 
while simultaneously increasing their level of violent activity. Research conducted by 
Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl had similar findings to this concept as well. Once 
nonviolent demonstrators become casualties of a regime’s brutal repressive forces it 
mobilizes the population to act on their behalf and increases the recruitment pool for 
rebels looking to gain more support.41  This decreases the cost of collective action as 
many citizens want justice for the atrocities that were committed against innocent 
activists who were legally exercising their right to protest. Therefore, when looking to 
determine when state repression has an escalatory effect on dissident activities, it is vital 
to address if the opposition is peacefully protesting or whether they are using violent 
means to achieve what they want. Another aspect that is also important to keep in mind 
when assessing the likelihood that repression will trigger civil war onset is to look at the 
type of repression being carried out, meaning whether it is selective or collective in 
nature.  
 Philip Hultquist published a study assessing the effectiveness of collective 
repression as a counterinsurgency technique. What was found is that when indiscriminate 
violence is carried out by a regime it increases the probability that an escalation to civil 
war onset will occur. When states use indiscriminate repression tactics against their own 
people, they do not bother to distinguish between those who were actively involved in 
either violent rebellion and those who were simply innocent bystanders, violent force is 
applied to everyone equally. Under these conditions, citizens view normal channels for 
political expression as closed and they come to the conclusion that even if they did not 
participate in these uprisings their safety is at risk which causes them to join the 
opposition. 42 This is how repression can lead to civil war onset depending on the type 
and target these actions are carried out on. Since this research was conducted using a 
40 Mark Irving Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and 
Dissent,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 31, no. 1 (1987): 270.  
 
41 Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl, “Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest,” 525.  
  
42 Philip Hultquist, “Is Collective Repression an Effective Counterinsurgency Technique? Unpacking the 
Cyclical Relationship Between Repression and Civil Conflict,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 
(2015): 8.  
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cross-national study to determine repression’s effect on conflict escalation it is only able 
to produce a generalizable finding.  Also it looked at the impact indiscriminate repression 
had on an already armed insurgency so future studies should focus on the effects of this 
type of repression on unarmed protestors. Case studies and small-N research designs will 
have better accounts of how exactly this process works by looking at individual instances 
of repression instead of using statistical analysis over a large number of countries.  
 In the literature it is hard to come across research projects that utilize small-N 
designs to assess the role of repression on civil war onset, although luckily, few do exist. 
One study, which was only a part of Kirssa Cline Ryckman’s dissertation, put forth an 
escalation process model to show how repression leads to the onset of civil war in which 
she used empirical data from the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings to test her hypotheses. The 
process leading up to a civil war requires five steps, first a protest movement must form, 
then it needs to gain significant strength, next it will switch its orders from calling on the 
government to modify specific policies to demanding regime change, then these 
dissidents will transform into a rebel group and finally the government must respond with 
violence in return.43  In this sense, repression only works in the opposite favor of the 
regime as it mobilizes larger portions of the population to join rebel groups since they no 
longer feel as if they are safe. Therefore, the dependence on violent repression tactics 
only works to escalate the conflict to the level of civil war onset.  
 Figures from 17 countries in the Middle East and North Africa which were 
engaged in the Arab Spring uprisings were analyzed. The statistics on these occurrences 
were collected from major world publications from the Lexis-Nexis database and were 
then transformed into sequences of events that were compared against each other in order 
to form clusters that were similar in nature. These results were then evaluated against the 
escalation process model to see if they followed the five steps hypothesized to lead to 
civil war onset. If countries with similar events were clustered together and their protest 
movements advanced along the five phases, then the hypotheses were deemed as 
supported. To determine if a movement gained strength, regular weekly protests with 
over 10,000 participants had to be observed and conveyed in the articles that were 
43 Kirssa Cline Ryckman, “Repression and the Civil-War Life-Cycle: Explaining the Use and Effect of 
Repression Before, During, and After Civil War” (PhD. diss., University of Arizona, 2012), 102. 
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accessed. To assess when the uprisings switched their goals to demand regime change 
also had to be reflected in the reports that were utilized for this study. If a movement was 
powerful and calling for the country’s top leaders to step down, then the government’s 
strategy in responding to these proclamations was coded depending on whether or not 
they used repression or accommodation to quell these rising tensions.  Lastly, in instances 
in which the regime responded violent force, it was necessary to determine if the protest 
movements metastasized into rebel forces which was verified by news articles where 
such organizations declared themselves as such. The sequence of events was based on 
three types of responses from the government which were either accommodation, 
repression or a mixture of the two. By organizing these in the order in which they 
occurred allowed for the specific responses to be greatly detailed regarding the number of 
times they were employed and how long they were carried out for. Once these events 
were clustered together, a symmetrical matrix was produced in which a cluster analysis 
could then be performed to group these sequences together based on their similarities.44  
The distance for what was to be considered to as “similar” was eased in order to allow for 
two or more sequences of events to be clustered together and this process was repeated 
until all sequences were linked. 
 The results showed that in three countries involved in the Arab Spring uprisings 
(Libya, Syria and Yemen) in which the governments resorted to harsh repression tactics, 
it escalated the conflicts towards civil war onset. The one case which did not fit this 
mold, was the uprising that took place in Bahrain.  The reason cited for why this country 
did not become engaged in a civil war of their own was due to the fact that 1,500 troops 
from Saudi Arabia and the UAE came to their “rescue”. According to this study they 
were responsible for clearing out all the protesters at Pearl Roundabout which essentially 
saved the Bahraini regime from succumbing to civil war.  Because of this factor, Bahrain 
was put into its own cluster and did not follow down the path predicted by the escalation 
process model. According to hypothesis 4b, in certain rare circumstances where protest 
movements escalate to this phase in the model they experience some kind of irregularity 
44 Ibid, 112.  
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that allows repression to eventually work.45 In this case, the troops from Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE are this irregularity. This is why although the Bahraini regime engaged in 
harsh repression against a strong movement, the rebel group did not form.  
 But this thesis seeks to downplay how the GCC intervention contributed to the 
reasons why an armed insurgency did not form in Bahrain by showing how the specific 
type of repression tactics carried out by the state’s security forces combined with external 
factors played a bigger role behind why this kind of organization was never established.   
 
Transnational Factors and Civil War 
 Traditionally, the literature on civil wars have tended to study this political 
phenomenon through a closed-polity approach which largely disregards external factors 
as having a causal effect on the probability that a country will descend into this type of 
intrastate conflict. Instead, transnational factors are thought to influence the duration and 
outcome of civil wars, but not the onset as this is attributed to specific economic and 
political factors occurring inside a state. External intervention in civil wars, for 
humanitarian and/or military purposes, have been studied to assess their impact on the 
duration of conflict while the role of external forces has also been analyzed to understand 
their role in civil war resolution, as certain scholars have predicted that the presence of a 
third party will increase the likelihood that a government and its opposition will come to 
negotiated settlements. But recent studies have started to examine the external factors 
which make the prospects for civil war onset more likely. One study conducted by 
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch found that the the likelihood of civil war onset is heavily 
influenced on whether or not surrounding countries are already engaged in civil wars of 
their own, taking notice of the spill-over effects of this type of violence.46 Other 
transnational factors have also been cited as increasing the likelihood of civil war onset, 
such as the size of diasporas in neighboring countries which are thought to be more 
willing to economically support their ethnic kin in staging a successful insurgency against 
their government.  
45 Ibid, 134.  
 
46 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 
3 (2007): 294.  
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 Today, civil wars can be strongly influenced by transnational factors which have 
been largely understudied in the recent literature. Although research in this area is 
starting to thrive, very few of these studies have attempted to advance the current 
findings on the causes of civil war onset by aligning their work with international 
relations scholarship. By applying IR theories which explain how interstate wars occur to 
intrastate conflicts will offer a more comprehensive image of civil war onset by 
addressing the role external actors can play. Bargaining theories and rationalist 
explanations will provide the conceptual framework needed to make these connections. 
Therefore, a brief review of these two international relations theories will be presented 
alongside the literature which has already attempted to incorporate these perspectives into 
their studies on civil war onset. To assess the transnational features of civil war, signals 
made by external actors will be defined and explained in order to show how they can 
influence the likelihood that this type of intrastate violence will occur. 
 
Bargaining Theories and Interstate War      
 When conflicts erupt between states it is usually attributed to differences 
regarding policy choices or the allocation of resources.47 In order to try and mitigate the 
conflict from escalating to a full-blown war several attempts are made in which the 
countries engaged in these disagreements try to come to a negotiated settlement. Thus the 
bargaining process begins in which states will try and influence other’s expectations 
about what they are willing to compromise on. In instances like these, features of 
cooperation and conflict can be seen as all actors have incentives to come to a mutual 
agreement versus the costs of going to war but they have contrasting ideas on the specific 
conditions of the agreement. Sometimes states will make a commitment to carry out a 
specific action in the future which is expected to make others succumb to terms of their 
liking. Promises to provide certain benefits to countries may be made if they agree to 
another’s stipulations, but if states are still unwilling to budge than others may threaten to 
use force against them. In this case, all parties to the conflict must assess the credibility of 
these claims and decide whether or not they will change their position. War is averted 
47 Clayton Lynn Thyne, “Cheap Signals, Costly Consequences: How International Relations Affect Civil 
Conflict” (PhD. diss., University of Iowa, 2007), 23.  
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when states are confident that other states will carry out their threats so they decide to 
come to a final agreement that is tolerable to everyone, but when states are uncertain 
about the willingness and capabilities of other states to actually go forward with their 
threats they will resort to violent means to settle their disputes.48 By going to war states 
are able to become aware of others capabilities and resolve which will then enable them 
to finally come to a mutually agreed upon settlement.   
 
Rationalist Explanations and Interstate Wars  
 Going to war is costly for all parties involved which is why rational actors try to 
avoid it by all means necessary, but in certain instances wars end up taking place anyway.  
A common rationalist explanation for the occurrence of interstate wars is due to the 
anarchical nature of the international system in which no supranational governing 
authority exists to enforce the law and therefore nothing is in place to prevent a state from 
using force and going to war with another.49  But the lack of a global “police force” does 
not explain why this prevents states from negotiating agreements in which both would 
prefer to the alternative of fighting. Also, under the conditions of anarchy states must rely 
on their own self-help to ensure their survival. A state may simply be trying to make 
itself more secure by increasing its military capabilities but this essentially makes other 
states less secure which can lead to a security dilemma and eventually war. Although if 
the first state did not anticipate this domino effect would occur resulting in a costly war, 
then the problem is one of miscalculation not anarchy in which bargaining could have 
been used to resolve it.50 Other rationalist explanations focus on the logical reasons states 
would engage in preventive and preemptive wars. If a hegemonic power is loosing its 
influence and it believes that it will be attacked in the near future by a rising power than 
this is said to make a preventive war rational. The mere shift in the balance of power is 
used as the explanatory factor that causes states to go to war but this does not consider 
how both parties could construct an agreement that leaves both better. In the situation of a 
preemptive war, both states would prefer to live in harmony with one another but states 
48 Ibid, 23, 43.  
 
49 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 384.  
 
50 Ibid, 381.  
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can never be certain if another’s commitment to this is credible. Therefore, a state may 
decide to attack another before it reneges on its promise of maintaining peace. A largely 
unexamined concept in rationalist explanations on the causes of interstate war is that of 
threat perceptions which has only recently taken the intentions of a state as a source of 
threat that is independent of military capabilities.51 When a state is uncertain about the 
willingness of another to carry out their threats it may increase the likelihood that they 
will go to war because they may not want to risk being unprepared against a possible 
imminent attack in the near future. Therefore, the lack of information regarding the true 
intentions and capabilities of another state can be the driving force leading to interstate 
wars.  
 
Both Theories of Interstate War        
 A common thread intertwining these two theories together is the fact that in both 
instances, privately held information regarding one’s capabilities and intentions creates 
the conditions for uncertainty which leads to the onset of war. From the rationalist 
perspective, if both parties in a conflict accurately represented this information then the 
prospective loser would decline to fight. While the bargaining theory predicts that if both 
states were truthful about their intentions towards one another then they would be able to 
reach a mutual agreement over the contested issue at hand. When states threaten others, 
whether they are serious or not, they want to convince everyone else that they intend to 
act in hopes of making others yield to the goals they are trying to achieve. But when other 
parties to the conflict are uncertain over the credibility of these threats and another state’s 
actual capabilities wars are likely to ensue.  
 For this reason, it is plausible to conclude that if a country’s foreign policy 
choices to go to war are receptive to and influenced by the perceptions they have 
regarding another state’s intentions, then these overt threats from one state to another can 
convey information.52  There are two types of threats employed to influence states’ 
51 Janice Gross Stein, “Threat Perception in International Relations,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Psychology, 2nd ed., edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 366.  
52 Robert F. Trager, “Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters,” American Political 
Science Review 104, no. 2 (2010): 347.  
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perceptions of others, one being verbal warnings and the other actual physical threats. 
Normally, these spoken threats are simply designed to signal the capacity and intention of 
one state to inflict harm on another and usually take the form of “if-then” conditional 
statements. Whereas physical threats are non-verbal signals that intend to communicate 
the seriousness of one’s intent to punish undesirable behavior such as mobilizing troops 
or creating new alliances.53  
 
Interstate Signaling  
 When states attempt to inform another of their intentions using threats, this is 
referred to as a signaling game in international relations. One player, the sender, tries to 
convey information about the future moves they will make in response to the possible 
moves the receiving state may take.54  One thing is certain regarding communication 
between states in the international system and that is the fact that several possible courses 
of action are available for the threatening state to make, but the problem is that the 
receiving state is unsure which they will choose.  When disagreements arise, all states 
involved may hope for an agreement to be reached over the costs of going to war, but 
somewhere along the line there is a conflict of interest at some level over how this 
settlement is to be reached. These differences in interests allow scholars to explore 
instances of strategic information transmission, where the sender may attempt to bluff 
and exaggerate their willingness to carry out a threat to advance their interests at the 
expense of the receiver.55 Knowing this is a possibility, the receiving state must decide 
whether or not to discredit the signals of the sender or to take them seriously.  
 Some signals are more credible than others because they can convey more 
concrete information to the receiving state about the actual capabilities and intentions of 
another state, whereas other signals are more ambiguous in nature. Cheap signals are 
equivalent to verbal threats and actors face no significant cost to make these types of 
claims. Most verbal communication between states, such as diplomatic statements, can be 
53 Janice Gross Stein, “Threat Perception in International Relations,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Psychology, 370.  
 
54 James D. Morrow, Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 50.  
 
55 Ibid, 51.  
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thought of as cheap signals that still have the potential to affect a state’s perceptions of 
another’s intentions to carry out a threat or not. Costly signals on the other hand are those 
threats which would be pricey for a state to break as these signals convey meaning that 
the sender is willing to incur some high cost to carry out their threats. Therefore, they are 
seen as more credible than cheap signals as they create less uncertainty about a state’s 
true intentions which convinces the receiver of the credibility of the sender’s threat.56 
Overall, states send signals as an attempt to convey a message about their intended 
actions in the future, but understanding these proclamations does not necessarily require 
believing them because honest actors along with deceivers can send the same messages. 
This is one of the main reasons why states who are the intended receiver of these signals 
pay critical attention to the reputation of the state sending these signals in order to 
decipher their credibility.57  Now that these theories on the causes of interstate was have 
been thoroughly explained, they will be applied and related to intrastate conflict to show 
how they can also be utilized in the civil war literature as well.  
 
International Relations Theories and Intrastate Conflict 
 With few exceptions, the civil war onset literature has exclusively examined 
factors within a state in order to explain how conflict arises between a government and an 
opposition group. This is extremely problematic as states do not simply exist in a vacuum 
and they can be influenced by outside forces. Applying the bargaining model and 
rationalist explanations for interstate wars to intrastate conflicts will show how external 
actors can effect the decision-making processes of a regime and its opposition to reach 
mutual negotiations or opt for continued violence based on the types of signals they send 
and how they are perceived. 
 In all states, a certain level of opposition to the government exists at all times but 
particular circumstances make it highly unlikely that these groups will try to overthrow 
the regime for several reasons. Sometimes people’s current situations are not deemed bad 
enough to risk their lives by joining a rebellion, in other cases a government may be so 
56 Ibid, 50-51.  
 
57 Robert Jervis, “Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images,” in Political 
Psychology, edited by Kristen Renwick Monroe (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2002), 304.  
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repressive that opposition groups have little or no chance of openly congregating without 
facing grave consequences or simply because dissidents are able to come to a mutually 
agreed upon contract with the state in order to avoid the costs of fighting. Just as in 
interstate wars, some level of uncertainty must be present for civil wars to occur as well. 
If a government and its opposition were completely aware of the information regarding 
each other’s capabilities, resolve and terms of agreement they would be willing to 
compromise on, then they would be able to peacefully settle their problems without 
resorting to combat. As war is costly for both parties, the regime and its dissidents will 
opt for negotiations that may be less than the ideal standards they were envisioning. But 
uncertainty regarding states intensions can effect the probability that interstate and 
intrastate wars may occur. A key to understanding how external actors can influence the 
onset of this kind of domestic conflict is based on the type of signals they send which are 
determined by the actions of a regime or its opposition.  
 Bargaining and rationalist explanations in international relations theories have 
provided significant influence for explaining how interstate wars can occur but few have 
attempted to extend this same logic to the study of civil war onset. There are several 
characteristics of interstate wars that are prevalent in civil wars as well and sometimes 
these features may even be more extreme in these circumstances.  Both IR theories 
proclaim that conflicts arise over a disagreement regarding either the allocation of 
resources or policy choices which hold true in intrastate conflicts as well. A government 
and its opposition both have incentives to misrepresent information regarding their 
abilities to carry out their threats against one another in pursuit of their demands.58 
Information problems leading to the uncertainty of others’ intentions and capabilities are 
actually more severe in intrastate conflicts. For starters, data about the size of potential 
rebel forces, their financial income and the level of support they have among their fellow 
citizens are usually hard for a government to obtain. Also, rebel groups may sometimes 
be unaware of their own strength while in other cases they may have a comprehensive 
understanding of their overall capabilities but they may have strong incentives to keep 
this knowledge a secret from the government because the security forces of the state 
58 Barbara F. Walter, “Bargaining Failures and Civil War,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 
245.  
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would attempt to eradicate their sphere of influence. Ideally, governments would only 
like to grant concessions to dissident groups in which they believe have a strong support 
base and are well funded, but they have significant trouble determining weak rebel forces 
from strong ones unless they engage them in battle first.  This is how the uncertainty of 
threats from rebel forces can cause a state to opt for continued violence instead of 
reaching a negotiated settlement. Another uncertainty issue arises when governments 
have an incentive to withhold information about their willingness to engage in battle or 
grant concessions because they may want to appear tough in the face of numerous 
potential challengers.59  Some governments may be secretly uncommitted to actually 
going to war with an opposition group and may be eager to grant concessions but they 
want to remain tough in the eyes of the population.  In this case, uncertainty problems 
arise just as in interstate wars, regarding the true intentions of rebels’ and governments’ 
capabilities and their willingness to carry out their threats. 
 Also, before civil wars break out, large power asymmetries always exist between 
potential rebel groups and the government which makes it more likely and harder to 
ascertain if the state will renege on its promises. In attempts to avoid conflict, they may 
offer to restructure the political process, share power or transfer autonomy but weak rebel 
groups have little capabilities to penalize a government should it fail to follow through 
with these agreements. While states in the international system still face the same 
commitment problems, they have a variety of economic, military and political means to 
keep each other from breaking their promises.60 As long as rebel groups have little ability 
to enforce the terms of an agreement, they may rather risk going to war than risk the 
potential that a state will not fulfill its commitments. While states in the international 
system still face the same commitment problems, they have a variety of economic, 
military and political means to keep each other from breaking their promises.61 As long 
as rebel groups have little ability to enforce the terms of an agreement, they may decide 
to continue engaging in violent conflict with the state than risk the potential that a 
59 Ibid, 248-250.  
 
60 Robert F. Trager, “Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters,” American Political 
Science Review 104, no. 2 (2010): 348.  
61 Robert F. Trager, “Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters,” American Political 
Science Review 104, no. 2 (2010): 348.  
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government would renege on its promises.  Although dissidents may not wish to engage 
in battle they are faced with the difficult task of negotiating with the regime in a 
condition where they have few mechanisms to monitor and check the behavior of the 
central government. 
 
Signals from External Actors and the Onset of Civil War  
 One way which can help increase or decrease the levels of uncertainty between a 
state and its opposition is through signals from external actors. Just as states in the 
international system signal to each other about the future actions they are willing to take 
if one state decides to behave in a certain manner, they also do this in cases of intrastate 
conflict as well. Several studies have been conducted to uncover the different types of 
signals and the impact they have on the actions of others. Although most of the research 
has centered around cases of interstate disputes, the findings can also be applied to 
instances of domestic strife between a regime and its opposition where the signals from 
external actors affect the probability that both sides will either reach a negotiated 
settlement or opt for continued violence instead.  
 According to work conducted by Robert Jervis and James D. Fearon, states which 
are the intended target of the signals should only focus on those which are deemed as 
“costly”. This is because costly signals decrease the level of uncertainty between states as 
the intended actions of the threatening state are readily observable and pricey for them to 
follow through on. The assumption is then that these types of signals cannot be readily 
faked and would have dire consequences should a state not take them.62 There are two 
types of costly signals that can be sent and each are thought to actively convince others of 
their intentions. The first type of costly signals are ones that “sink costs”, meaning that 
they are financially expensive for a state to endure and can be readily observed, examples 
of this include mobilizing troops or economic sanctions. 63 The second type of costly 
signals are ones which are harmful for the state to break because they are sensitive to the 
reactions of their domestic audience which would view their inability to carry out these 
62 Robert Jervis, “Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images,” in Political 
Psychology, edited by Kristen Renwick Monroe (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2002), 301. 
 
63 James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (1997): 70. 
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actions as a failure in the state’s foreign policy.  These can be thought of as promises to 
establish new trade ties or military alliances in which the sending state’s reputation is on 
the line internationally and domestically.64 When states experience severe domestic 
conflict, external actors are always prone to comment on these situations out of fear they 
may transform into a bigger problem. They attempt to signal to all parties involved in the 
dispute what are the appropriate actions that should be taken and signal which side they 
would be willing to support should more violence erupt.  Normally, states offer support to 
the government in power, as most rebel forces are not seen as a viable option for the 
future of a country. Therefore, states will send costly signals in support of a regime by 
promising new trade ties or military alliances which are aimed at forcing an opposition 
party to back down. In atypical situations external actors may send hostile signals to a 
government in which they threaten to mobilize troops and enforce economic sanctions if 
the government does not change its actions towards dissidents. In both cases, costly 
signals from external actors should increase the willingness of both parties to come to a 
mutually agreed upon settlement to end the violence because the threats being sent 
decrease the uncertainty that one side of the conflict will receive foreign support if a civil 
war were to break out. Therefore, costly signals affect the likelihood that a state and its 
opposition will more than likely reach mutual negotiations with one another, but cheap 
signals do not have this ability.        
 Cheap signals are considered as less credible than costly ones because they are 
simple statements of intent that do not involve taking any costly action. A study by 
Robert F. Trager claims that although cheap signals make a state’s willingness to carry 
out their threats harder to predict they can still affect the perceptions of intentions. 
Usually in interstate disputes, cheap signals are sent via diplomatic statements which 
attempt to convey information about the threat each poses to one another.65 Another 
comprehensive study, a dissertation by Clayton Lynn Thyne, relates signals from external 
actors to the cause of civil war onset, depending on the type of signal sent. Just as costly 
signals have two distinct types, so do cheap signals. Cheap signals that are supportive of 
64 Ibid, 70.  
 
65 Robert F. Trager, “Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters,” American Political 
Science Review 104, no. 2 (2010): 362. 
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a government are public statements from prominent political figures giving their support 
and offers for aid may be made as well. In the case of cheap signals that are hostile 
towards a government, public statements condemn the actions of a regime and threaten to 
use sanctions if they do not change their ways.66 Thyne tested these hypotheses through a 
large-N analysis of all states from 1949 to 1999 to see the effects that external actors had 
on the onset of civil war. In addition he also tested these hypotheses through a case study 
that examined how the cheap signals the United States sent affected the onset of the 
FLSN’s rebellion in Nicaragua in 1978.67 In both instances, he finds support for the 
hypothesis that cheap signals from external actors can cause civil war onset. 
 But in this thesis, signals from external actors are treated as an intermediate 
variable because the statements from prominent foreign powers are based on the actions 
of a regime and its opposition which determine whether or not they will be sent in 
support or against either side and whether or not they will be costly or cheap. The most 
important kind of signals to pay attention to are cheap ones because they introduce 
uncertainty into the bargaining process between a government and its opposition. When 
cheap signals condemning the repression tactics of a regime are made it causes dissidents 
to overestimate their fighting capabilities based on their future expectations that foreign 
allies would intervene on their behalf if a civil war did ensue while simultaneously 
causing them to increase their demands on the government, thus making it highly 
unlikely that mutual negotiations would be reached to end the rising hostilities.  
 
Definition of Terms  
 Throughout this thesis, the repression tactics that will be under investigation are 
those which are carried out by the state. Repression will be defined as coercive measures 
government authorities take to hinder domestic opposition and maintain their stronghold 
on power.68 A plethora of studies have treated state repression as a single entity that those 
in office use to deter dissidents from generating too much support for fear that their 
66 Clayton Lynn Thyne, “Cheap Signals, Costly Consequences: How International Relations Affect Civil 
Conflict” (PhD. diss., University of Iowa, 2007), 36.  
 
67 Ibid, 17.  
68Emily Hencken Ritter," Policy Disputes, Political Survival, and the Onset and Severity of State 
Repression," Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 1 (2014): 145.   
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political authority may be in jeopardy.  They neglect to realize that there are varying 
degrees of repression tactics that can be utilized by regimes and some are more successful 
at subduing protest movements while others only escalate the level of violence. 
Therefore, two elements, target and type, will be taken into account in order to pinpoint 
where the specific kind of repression methods used by both regimes vary. The target 
aspect denotes whom the aggression is carried out on, meaning whether or not the 
repression is selective or indiscriminate in nature. The latter category refers to when the 
state neglects to make a distinction between those who were actively protesting and those 
who were not, as violent force is equally inflicted on everyone in the surrounding 
vicinity. Whereas selective repression, on the other hand, is only directed at people who 
were participating in these movements. The type of repression simply means whether or 
not the tactics being carried out were in a violent or nonviolent fashion which can be 
conceptualized as restrictive laws versus the use of force. Nonviolent strategies are 
usually in the form of legislation preventing certain groups from publicly gathering or 
legally organizing while violent measures involve the physical harm of dissidents that can 
range from firing teargas into highly populated demonstrations, shooting regime 
opponents or systematic torture.  
The signals from external actors in this thesis will be classified into two 
categories, either “costly” or “cheap” statements that are in support of a regime or its 
opposition. Costly signals are those which are pricey for the signaling party to incur but 
they are deemed as more credible because of this.69  Costly signals in support of a regime 
are announcements to establish new military alliances or trade ties, while those that are 
against a regime will be in the form of economic sanctions or the mobilization of troops. 
Cheap signals cost relatively little for external actors to make which is why they are 
viewed as less reliable than their counterpart as they do not provide concrete information 
regarding whether or not the sending party will act if the level of violence in a country 
continues to rise.70  Cheap signals that are pro-government are vague statements of 
69James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (1997): 69.  
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support or offers for aid while anti-government signals are public declarations of 
condemnation or the withdrawal of foreign aid to a country. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Restatement of the Research Question and Aim of the Research  
 This thesis aspires to uncover the specific causal mechanisms that are responsible 
for the drastically different outcomes of the Arab Spring uprisings that took place in 
Bahrain and Syria. At first glance, these two countries may seem to have relatively little 
in common with one another, but after taking a more in-depth look at the two, it is 
revealed that they have unique, shared country-specific characteristics that distinguish 
them from the rest of the countries engulfed by the Arab Spring. In addition to this, both 
regimes responded in a nearly identical fashion to the emerging protest movements which 
made it seem probable at first that the aftermath of both uprisings would at least follow a 
similar path.  As this has clearly not been the case, this study intends to examine the 
underlying factors that shaped whether or not the protest movements would result in  
the onset of civil war or not. By investigating the understudied independent variable of 
repression, this thesis aims to show how a variance in the different type and target of 
repression led to the absence of civil war in Bahrain while resulting in the onset of it in 
Syria. In addition, it aims to show how the specific kind of repression tactics being used 
caused a variance in the signals being sent from external actors which also influenced the 
direction of the protest movements into or away from civil war onset. 
 
Why Bahrain and Syria? 
 The Arab Spring uprisings that occurred in Bahrain and Syria during the 
beginning months of 2011 were chosen as the cases best suited for the purpose of this 
analysis because they explicitly allow for the roles of repression and signals to be isolated 
in order to determine if they have the ability to cause the onset of civil war or not.  
 
The Shared Country-Specific Characteristics of Bahrain and Syria  
 The unique features of Bahrain and Syria distinguish them from the rest of the 
countries that were embroiled in Arab Spring uprisings of their own and essentially 
caused them to respond in a similar manner to the initially nonviolent protest movements 
that arose. An overview of their shared qualities will be presented to emphasize how they 
effected their reactions and thus made it seem highly probable that the aftermath of their 
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uprisings would result in similar circumstances.  
 For starters, both countries have highly heterogeneous populations that are split 
along ethnic and religious lines. In Bahrain, Sunni Muslims are actually considered to be 
the minority, but there are distinct cliques within this category, furthering the already 
fragmented archipelago. There are the Sunni Muslim tribes that are aligned with the 
ruling al-Khalifa family, the Nejdi non-tribal Arabs from Saudi Arabia and the Hawala, 
Arab settlers from neighboring Iran.71 While the majority of the population is comprised 
of the Baharnah, Arab Shiites who view themselves as the autochthonous inhabitants of 
the small island nation, in addition to a few Persian immigrants who only account for a 
small fraction of the Shiite community.72 In Syria, Sunni Muslim Arabs constitute the 
biggest ethno-religious group followed by the Kurds who are non-Arab Sunnis, as well as 
smaller factions of Alawites, Christians and Druze.73  
 On top of this, both regimes in power come from a minority group within the 
state, which is in stark contrast to all the other Arab Spring countries where the 
government and the security apparatuses are representative of the dominant majority 
group in the population in terms of ethnic and religious composition. In Bahrain, the 
reigning al-Khalifa family are Sunni Muslims who reside over a citizenry where 70% are 
Shia Muslims74 while in Syria, the ruling al-Assad clan are Alawites, an offshoot sect of 
Shiism, who are in command of a society made up of around 74% Sunni Muslims and 
10% Christians.75  
 
How these shared features effected their similar responses to the Arab Spring 
71 Nelida Fuccaro, Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf: Manama Since 1800 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 55.  
 
72 Ibid, 55-56.  
 
73 Şerban Filip Cioculescu, "Civil War and Proxy War in Syria: The Ugly Face of the Arab Spring," in 
Democracy and Security in the 21st Century: Perspectives on a Changing World, ed. Valentin Naumescu 
(Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 442.  
 
74 Zoltan Barany, "The "Arab Spring" in the Kingdoms" (Research paper, Arab Center for Research and 
Policy Studies, Qatar, 2012), 18, 19. 
 
75 Prados, Alfred B. and Jeremy M. Sharp, Syria: Political Conditions and Relations with the United States 
After the Iraq War (CRS Report for Congress. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2005), 
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protests  
 In countries where a minority group is presiding over a clearly defined dominant 
majority, this effects how those in power decide to handle their daily responsibilities and 
strongly influences their decision making processes as they are more often than not 
viewed as illegitimate leaders in the eyes of the population. As a result, these types of 
regimes and their ruling elite must assemble the state in such a way that it will ensure the 
persistence of their authority. To maintain their stronghold on power, they must resort to 
micromanaging all aspects of society to repress even the slightest signs of any opposition 
groups forming as they could not compete against other forces or civil organizations 
promising change in the social, political or economic realms as they belong to groups 
which are demographically inferior to the rest of the population.76 Therefore, the best 
way to guarantee their persistence overtime is to stack the army, police and secret service 
with members of their overrepresented minority to safeguard themselves against 
defectors and warrant regime loyalty. This simultaneously provides the government with 
the military might needed to oversee all other political institutions, giving them 
unrestrained capabilities to repress their opposition with an iron fist. 
 By taking a closer look at the intricacies that comprise the Bahraini and Syrian 
regimes, it is clear to see that they both employed all of these tactics with the hopes of 
continuing their rule despite the presence of a prevailing majority group. In both 
countries, the armed forces were ethnically stacked with members from their own distinct 
minority groups and critical key positions of authority were distributed among their co-
sectarians in attempts to further strengthen their allies and ensure allegiance to the 
regime.  As a final precautionary measure, both countries established their own informal 
security forces that were tasked to quietly coexist alongside the the military to weed out 
any individuals that were critical of the government and thus deemed to be a potential 
defector in the near future. In Bahrain, the military was lined with Sunnis, but the regime 
also permitted Muslims from this same sect in foreign countries to join their troops who 
were then granted citizenship in return for their services in attempts to generate a more 
76 Øystein Bøhler, "Ethnic Minority Rule and Prospects for Violent Conflicts" (Master's Thesis, University 
of Bergen, 2013), 23-25. 
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equal ration of Sunnis to Shiites.77 While in Syria, the Alawites held the greatest number 
of prominent political positions, controlled the top military units within the army and 
almost entirely dominated the Republican Guard, an elite division tasked with protecting 
the capital of Damascus from any potential coups as this city was formerly a prime target 
of such attempts.78 Finally, both regimes constructed unofficial, “off the books” types of 
security forces that carried out the regimes’ most immoral undertakings and were known 
as the shabiha, or ghosts, in Syria and the baltagiya, which is similar to thugs, in 
Bahrain.79  
 Consequently, once the Arab Spring uprisings within their own borders started 
gaining a noteworthy amount of momentum in the early months of 2011, it spurred the 
minority group leaders of the Bahraini and Syrian regimes into action which caused them 
to both respond to the initially nonviolent protesters with severe repression in order to put 
an immediate end to this type of civil disobedience. Their shared strategy of utilizing 
preventive repression tactics to contain potential revolutionary forces stems from the fact 
that their authority is in constant jeopardy as they only embody a small fraction of the 
population as a whole and therefore must instantly eliminate any threat to their rule. This 
is why the mass protests that took place in both countries were quickly met by 
government forces which brutally attacked peaceful protesters and only continued to 
intensify the severity of violent acts being inflicted on regime dissidents.  
 Both regimes attempted to justify their brutal reactions towards protesters by 
suggesting that the uprisings taking place were instigated by external forces that were 
plotting the overall demise of each nation. This was somehow supposed to validate their 
extreme uses of force as it was for the “greater good” of protecting and ensuring their 
country’s survival. In Bahrain, the chosen “enemy” was Iran who was accused of 
fostering a Shia conspiracy against the government while in Syria, the al-Assad regime 
listed a slew of perpetrators as the real antagonists of the uprisings, including Israel, the 
77 Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud and Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and 
Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 90.  
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United States, Saudi Arabia and even the Palestinians. This also allowed both regimes to 
pit different religious sects against one another, even though the original protests were 
peaceful, cross-sectarian in nature and called for greater social, economic and political 
rights such as constitutional reforms, freer elections and an end to their state’s human 
rights abuses.  By invoking this discourse, both regimes were able to turn this particular 
frame into a self-fulfilling prophecy by playing on the fears of their religious minorities 
through insinuations that their rights and potential lives could be at stake if the majority 
rose to power. In Bahrain, this rhetoric was able to rally the Sunni minority against the 
Shiites, even the ones who had legitimate grievances with the state and similarly wanted 
political reforms as well, it still caused them to eventually back the regime and further 
enflame the sectarian animosities against the Shiite majority. While in Syria, the regime 
framed any challenge to their authority as a danger to all religious minorities, not just the 
Alawites.          
 A final but nonetheless important commonality that exists between the two 
uprisings surprisingly has nothing to do with the similar responses each regime took 
against protesters but rather how the international community reacted to the situations in 
both countries which bore a striking resemblance. In the beginning stages of the 
uprisings, initial statements or signals from prominent external actors condemning the 
actions of the Bahraini and Syrian regimes were almost nonexistent, despite their 
grotesque use of force against their own citizens. The responses from high ranking 
political figures in the United States will be used for the purpose of providing two 
examples of this type of behavior. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, flew 
to Bahrain only four weeks after the uprisings started and upon his arrival home he said 
to the public, “Obviously, leading reform and being responsive is the way we’d like to 
see this move forward”, but he failed to denounce the overt repression methods of the 
regime.80 In Syria, the protests started in mid-March, but it was not until the end of July 
that then Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, altered the phrase, “Bashar al-Assad is losing 
legitimacy”, to that of, “Bashar al-Assad has lost his legitimacy.”81 These two examples 
80 Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform, 87-89.  
 
81 James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University 
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represent only a microcosm of the signals that were sent by external actors during the 
beginning phases of both uprisings which neglected to acknowledge and comment on the 
atrocities being committed against peaceful protesters.  
 
Hypotheses and how the theoretical framework of escalation and signaling theories 
are relevant to my research  
 
 The first hypothesis postulates that the type and target of repression carried out by 
the Bahraini and Syrian regimes throughout the duration of the protests can account for 
the different outcomes seen in each country today. The second hypothesis posits that the 
specific type and target of repression caused a variation in the signals from external 
actors, essentially determining if they were made in support of the regime or its 
opposition which influenced both parties’ decision making processes in deciding to come 
to mutual agreements or opt for incurring the costs of going to war with one another. The 
dependent variable can be conceptualized in terms of the absence of civil war onset 
(Bahrain) or the acceleration to the onset of civil war (Syria). This thesis hopes to add to 
the civil war onset literature by contributing to a better understanding of how certain 
types (nonviolent/violent) and targets (selective/indiscriminate) of state repression 
combined with signals from external actors can lead to this type of intrastate conflict.  
 The type and target of repression carried out by the Bahraini and Syrian regimes 
throughout the duration of the protests can account for the different outcomes seen in 
each country today. Although both the Bahraini and Syrian security forces responded to 
the initially nonviolent protestors with harsh brutality, the main difference lies within the 
target of their repression. In Bahrain, the repression methods carried out by the state were 
more selective in nature compared to the Syrian response, as most of the violence was 
directed specifically at protesters in the city’s main square, Pearl Roundabout. While in 
Syria the regime’s first reaction to the uprisings was to rely almost absolutely on 
indiscriminate repression, which fails to distinguish between those who were actively 
involved in protesting and those who were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. 
In addition to this, more nonviolent types of repression tactics were taken by the Bahraini 
regime through the adoption of various laws aimed at hindering the oppositional force’s 
ability to legally organize and garner more support from the public. In Syria, the type of 
repression methods were mostly violent in nature, as the regime was more focused on 
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using tanks and heavy weaponry against mostly unarmed civilians, butchering large 
amounts of people as the protests went on.  
 The type of signals sent by external actors towards each regime and their 
opposition eventually changed overtime based on the divergent repression tactics being 
carried out by each regime which contributed to the different outcomes seen in each 
country today. This study will aim to show how cheap anti-government signals that 
involve avowals of condemnation and threats of economic sanctions towards the regime 
can influence the likelihood that a state and its opposition will not reach a mutual 
negotiation to settle their differences and continue to engage in violent conflict with one 
another. In Bahrain, the few signals or statements made by external actors were regularly 
in favor of the regime as offers of support were constantly being reiterated while in Syria, 
the signals that were made were staunchly against the actions of the government and 
support was instead shifted in favor of the oppositional forces as they publicly 
condemned the use of harsh repression being carried out by the security forces against 
unarmed civilians.  
 
Research Design  
 In order to address the reason why civil war broke out in Syria but not Bahrain, a 
qualitative, comparative case study will be used to test for causation regarding the 
independent variable, repression, and the intermediate variable of signals, to see if they 
had a deterring or escalatory effect on the protest movements that took place in these 
countries during the timeframe from January 2011 until January 2012. Since the research 
question of this thesis is in nature, an explanatory inquiry, the central aim of this study is 
to systematically examine covariation between the variables of interest among these two 
cases for the purpose of causal analysis and to rule out rival explanations to come to a 
final conclusion.82 The comparative case study methodology was chosen as the best 
suited strategy for carrying out this task over other approaches such as the experimental 
and statistical methods for several reasons. Overall, the best procedure for obtaining 
valid, objective scientific explanations is through the experimental method because it can 
82 David Collier, “The Comparative Method,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, ed. Ada 
W. Finifter (Washington, D.C.: The American Political Science Association, 1993), 108.  
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situationally manipulate the empirical data to be observed. But this approach is rarely 
used in the field of political science due to practical constraints and more importantly, 
ethical impediments.83 On the other hand, the statistical method involves the 
mathematical maneuvering of observable data conducive to uncovering controlled 
relationships among variables. Although it can only control for key variables suspected to 
exert influence and not for all the others, it attempts to handle this situation by means of 
partial correlations instead. This approach is most favorable for scholars conducting 
large-N studies, but for academics analyzing only a few number of cases the comparative 
methodology is more feasible to use as the small quantity of relative situations do not 
allow for this kind of systematic control by way of partial correlations.84 After taking all 
these factors into consideration, this is why the comparative case study method was 
adopted for the purpose of this study to allow for a more comprehensive analysis on how 
the roles of repression and signals from external actors can effect the likelihood of civil 
war onset.  
 As Bahrain and Syria are the only subjects of interest in this project, it was more 
beneficial to use a qualitative research design over a quantitative one as the small number 
of cases allows for the opportunity to provide a complete, in-depth account of the specific 
phenomenon under study which strengthens the internal and measurement validity of 
causal inferences made. Although, a commonly cited weakness of qualitative, 
comparative case studies is that they lack external validity, meaning that the results 
obtained cannot be generalized for different situations or ones involving larger 
populations. This is why a thick description of the cases will be presented as a means to 
solving this applicability problem. It is important to briefly reinforce the justification for 
small-N studies and therefore, worth mentioning a few issues illuminating these problems 
of validity. Researchers carrying out large-N studies can fall victim to “conceptual 
stretching”, where an idea so general is applied to a wide range of situations and when 
newer cases are added, the specific meaning of the concept at hand may not directly 
apply to them. Also, by doing this it fails to highlight the differences and similarities that 
83 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” The American Political Science 
Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 684.  
 
84 Ibid, 684.  
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exist between cases which is the fundamental ingredient for meaningful comparative 
analysis.85    
 A bigger constraint that this methodology must address is what several refer to as 
the “many variables small N” problem, but if properly utilized it can still compete with 
alternative explanations.  In order to do this, the most similar systems design will be used 
to match Bahrain and Syria on all the important country-specific characteristics that they 
share which are not relevant to this study, in effect controlling for them and thus reducing 
the many variables issue. Although, it is nearly impossible to systematically match cases 
on all relevant control variables, a looser application of the most similar systems was 
applied. As the number of variables cannot be reduced by using comparable cases in 
which many variables are constant, except with regard to the phenomenon under 
investigation, it permits for the formation of relationships among a few key variables 
while keeping constant as many extraneous variables as possible.86  As this thesis is 
interested in establishing whether or not there is causal relation between the independent 
variable, repression, as well as the intermediate variable, signals from external actors, and 
the dependent variables which can be conceptualized as the presence of civil war onset or 
the absence of it, the most similar systems design is the most suitable technique for 
achieving this goal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 David Collier, “The Comparative Method,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, 110. 
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CHAPTER 4: BAHRAIN 
 
 On February 14, 2001, Bahrainis went out to cast their vote on the newly-
proposed principles outlined in the National Action Charter, put forth by King Hamad bin 
Isa al-Khalifa, in his attempts to end the ongoing unrest of the 1990s, return the country 
to constitutional rule and liberalize the state. Therefore, it was no surprise that the 
national referendum ratified the charter with an overwhelmingly high level of approval, 
as 90% of the population participated in the election and out of this, 98.4% voted in favor 
of it.87 At first, the reforms seemed promising as they established an 80-member 
bicameral parliament, the National Assembly, that consisted of a 40-member, 
government-appointed upper house, the Shura Council, and a 40-member, popularly-
elected lower house, the Council of Representatives, in addition to granting universal 
suffrage to women which made Bahrain the first Gulf Cooperation Council member-state 
to do so.88 But little did the ruling al-Khalifa family know that a decade later, on the 10th 
anniversary of the National Action Charter, that protests would rock this tiny island 
nation to its core.   
 
Background History  
 The date that most in the Western world associate with love and compassion, 
February 14, 2011 had a completely different meaning in Bahrain as citizens declared it 
to be a “Day of Rage” which signified to the world that the Arab Spring uprisings had 
finally reached the shores of the Persian Gulf. The initial demands of the protesters were 
numerous but they generally centered around finally implementing the long-overdue 
reforms promised to them in the National Action Charter that never materialized, as many 
felt that the constitutional amendments failed to adequately address people’s main 
complaint of not having equitable political representation.89 Although members of the 
87Steven Wright and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Political Change in the Arab Oil Monarchies: From 
Liberalization to Enfranchisement,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 
83, no. 5 (2007): 919.  
  
88Sanja Kelly and Julia Breslin, eds., Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid 
Resistance (New York: Freedom House / Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 64.  
 
89Kenneth Katzman, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S (CRS Report for Congress. Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 2011), 2.  
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Council of Representatives were elected based on popular vote, the trivial abilities 
granted to them rendered this lower house of parliament a largely ineffective government 
body that was seemingly created for more symbolic purposes to appease societal 
demands at the time. This is why critics on the regime to grant the Council more genuine 
powers, to stop ethnically gerrymandering electoral districts and to provide better job 
opportunities for all Bahrainis. During the first stage of the protest movements, relatively 
few people demanded that the royal family step down as they preferred meaningful 
reform over revolution.  
 But fast-forward a couple months ahead to April and only remnants of the once-
promising demonstrations could be seen as they had been almost entirely obliterated by 
the regime. The Bahraini uprising resulted in one of the only clear-cut victories for 
repression throughout the course of the Arab Spring.90 What was it about the kind of 
repression tactics that the Bahraini security forces used which enabled them to quell 
rising tensions and deter citizens away from continuing to actively protest? Various 
scholars have attributed the intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Jazeera 
Shield Forces to their overall success. The GCC, acting in accordance with one of their 
core principles, indivisible security, determined that it was their collective responsibility 
to uphold, protect and ensure the safety of the Bahraini regime which prompted them to 
take action.91 Many have been too quick in accrediting Bahrain’s triumphant victory over 
the demonstrations to the intervention by the GCC-JSF because it is the easiest, most 
straightforward explanation. 
 In general, most people are not familiar with this tiny archipelago comprised of 33 
islands, equaling 290 square miles combined, or for comparison purposes less than the 
size of New York City as a whole, in addition to housing a population of only 1.3 million 
in which 50% of the inhabitants are immigrants.92 Bahrain may be the smallest Middle 
Eastern country, but its size belies its critical importance to the American government, as 
90Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2013), 151.   
 
91Karl P. Mueller, Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (Santa Monica: RAND, 2015), 
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92 “Bahrain,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ba.html. 
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the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet is stationed there, making this country a very vital ally. This 
is also why most Western critics remained silent in commenting on the events taking 
place in Bahrain and were negligent in denouncing the regime’s violent use of force 
 against peaceful protesters. On top of all that, Bahrain normally receives relatively little 
news coverage so it came as no shock that once the demonstrations began only a select 
number of Arab television stations decided to closely monitor the situation and 
international media outlets paid even less attention to the uprising.  
 All of these factors put together have resulted in the common trend of claiming 
that the external support Bahrain received prevented the country from descending into 
civil war onset, however, those asserting this statement as truth have not bothered to take 
a closer look into the finer details of the uprising. Although the constant reiteration that 
the al-Khalifa regime was only able to conquer the uprising due to the GCC forces gives 
this claim some verisimilitude, in reality, it represents a gross miscalculation of 
accountability as it was the Bahraini regimes own security forces who violently repressed 
their own people which resulted in the termination of the protest movements. The GCC 
intervention was not responsible for rescuing Bahrain from internal breakdown, at best, 
the crackdown on protesters might have taken a bit longer to accomplish without GCC 
assistance, but nevertheless the regime still would have triumphed.93  
 The Bahraini uprising that took place during February and March of 2011 
deserved more attention than it received, especially since it showed the international 
community that the oil-rich monarchies of the Gulf were not immune to popular revolt 
and also due to the fact that it was the largest of the Arab Spring uprisings, in terms of the 
percentage of the total population that actively took to the streets in protest.94 But most 
importantly because the outcome of the uprising represented one of the only instances in 
which state repression succeeded in ending the unrest as many other autocratic rulers 
throughout the MENA region during this time attempted similar tactics, most did not end 
up working in their favor. Consequently, the case of Bahrain provides for an interesting 
research opportunity to uncover the specific kind of repression methods that were utilized 
93 Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform, 89-90.   
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by the government’s security forces which prevented the onset of civil war from 
occurring. In order to conduct an in-depth examination into the explicit dynamics of the 
uprising, data was collected from five sources, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, the U.S. State Department, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
and the Political Terror Scale, that were specifically related to the repression tactics of the 
regime. The material was coded accordingly and sorted into four, overarching categories 
of repression which are as follows: violent, nonviolent, indiscriminate and selective. 
Tallying up the total number of times each kind of repression method was carried out 
helped in determining the theme of the three phases of the uprising.  A chronological 
presentation of the events that took place will be given along with a systematic 
application of thematic analysis that will unmask the distinct kind of state repression 
tactics that had a deterring or escalatory effect on the momentum of the protest 
movements. This will allow me to see if the first hypothesis of this thesis is supported or 
not, which predicts that indiscriminate and violent repression will accelerate protest 
movements while selective and violent repression will end in a victory for the 
government. A thick description of the interactions between the state security forces and 
the demonstrators will be given to emphasize how it ultimately led to the regime’s 
success.  
 
Timeline of the Uprising – Phase One (February 14 – February 18)  
 The first stage of the uprising was relatively short, lasting for only five days, but 
nonetheless, a consistent patterned response regarding the repression tactics of the state’s 
security forces and signals from external actors can still be clearly observed.  Like many 
other authoritarian leaders during this time that were attempting to overcome the protest 
movements erupting within their own territories, the ruling al-Khalifa family followed 
suit and chose to use violent force against nonviolent demonstrators with the hopes of 
deterring them from continuing to rise up against the regime. But unlike many 
authoritarian leaders during this time, the international community’s vague response to 
the uprising taking place in Bahrain showed their strong determination to sustain the 
current regime as cheap signals were consistently sent to emphasize their unwavering 
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support to the al-Khalifa family, whereas many other dictators in the MENA region were 
immediately condemned for their barbaric reaction towards peaceful protesters.  
 On February 14th, protesters peacefully gathered at one of the most popular 
plazas, Pearl Roundabout, in the capital city, Manama, essentially taking a page out of the 
tactics Egyptian protesters used when they decided to hold their mass demonstrations in 
Cairo’s Tahrir Square. This site was a symbolic one because not only did the statute that 
lies in the center of this main traffic circle represent the country’s pearl-diving past, it 
was also situated in the heart of Bahrain, making it an ideal location to host the first 
large-scale protests.95 The riot police responded to the situation in an unnecessary and 
shockingly inhuman manner as large quantities of teargas were hurled into the colossal 
crowd of protesters along with an abundance of rubber bullets that were shot at them as 
well. Eventually they opened fire with live ammunition as a final attempt to disperse the 
massive amounts of people that were continuing to occupy the area. By the end of the 
day, a single fatality was recorded, as one protester was killed by the riot police.96 The 
repression methods utilized by the state security forces in this instance are classified as 
violent and selective as those who were actively engaged in protesting were targeted with 
severe aggression.  
 On February 15th, a funeral procession was held in honor of the protester who was 
killed the day prior in which thousands of Bahrainis showed up to pay their respects. 
Those in attendance were a mixture of people, as some were involved in the 
demonstrations from the 14th while others had not been associated with them whatsoever. 
But when the riot police showed up to the scene, they concluded that the majority of 
those present had partaken in the events of the previous day and acting on this “logic” 
they haphazardly opened fire on everyone in mourning with live ammunition, rubber 
bullets and teargas.97 In this case, the tactics of the riot police are categorized as violent 
and indiscriminate because they targeted people while they were grieving the loss of a 
95 Kristen Boon, Aziz Z. Huq and Douglas C. Lovelace, Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, 
vol. 123, Global Stability and U.S. National Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 539.  
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Matrook,” Amnesty International, February 15, 2011.   
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fellow Bahraini and were visibly not engaged in any form of protest during the time of 
attack.  
 Additionally, on this day as well, half way across the world the U.S. Department 
of State was gearing up to issue one of their first press releases regarding the unraveling 
situation in the small Gulf archipelago. In the report, it expressed America’s growing 
concern with the path the uprising was starting to take but whole-heartedly welcomed the 
al-Khalifa regime’s ‘pledge’ to uncover and hold accountable those who were responsible 
for the deaths of the unarmed demonstrators.98  This statement is classified as a cheap 
signal that was pro-government as it merely articulated the United State’s stance towards 
one of their most vital allies in the region which is that it would not publically denounce 
their actions but rather highlight how the U.S. supports their next moves to settle the 
rising tensions.  
 Two days later at 3AM on the 17th, security forces conducted a surprise attack on 
protesters who were camped out at Pearl Roundabout. According to an eyewitness at the 
scene, they launched “tons of teargas” into several tents without caring to check if those 
inside were sound asleep or not.99 As a result of their disdain for basic humanity, there 
were several reports of young children injured on this day.  These kind of repression 
tactics are characterized as violent and indiscriminate because although protesters were 
targeted, the majority of them were sleeping when they were viciously assaulted. To 
compound the atrocities that were being committed, the riot police also prevented 
ambulances dispatched to Pearl Roundabout from reaching the wounded and one incident 
was reported in which four paramedics were beaten by the security forces for attempting 
to break the blockade.100 Prohibiting hospital vehicles from entering the main parameters 
to rescue those in dire need of assistance qualifies as a nonviolent and indiscriminate 
repression tactic as medical personnel were stopped from performing their duties of 
treating the wounded. But assaulting these same medical personnel while they were 
98 U.S. Department of State, Recent Protests (February 15, 2011).  
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trying to pick up the injured is a kind of indiscriminate and violent repression technique 
as they were attacked for merely doing their job. Throughout the remainder of the day, 
the government enforced travel bans on some of the country’s most vocal political 
activists, thus preventing them from fleeing Bahrain to avoid being arbitrarily detained by 
the security forces who were tasked with ensuring their silence during this tumultuous 
period of unrest.101 This is grouped as a type of selective and nonviolent repression 
method because it violates a specific group of people’s right to freedom of movement as 
those who were targeted were well-known critics of the regime.  
 As February 18th rolled around, thousands more Bahrainis had uniformly taken to 
the streets to voice their strong condemnation of the regime’s ongoing use of violent 
force against unarmed demonstrators and they demanded justice for those who had been 
injured and killed by the security forces in addition to still continuing to call on the 
government to meet their political, social and economic demands.102 The protests at Pearl 
Roundabout resumed and as predicted, the security forces once again responded with the 
same violent and selective repression tactics that they had used in the days’ prior as bouts 
of teargas, rubber bullets and live ammunition were dispersed throughout the crowds. 
They also applied these same measures against protesters who were praying near Pearl 
Roundabout, but since the people targeted were not involved in demonstrating at the time 
of attack, this instance is classified as a case of indiscriminate and violent repression.103 
Lastly, they maintained their blockade against ambulances trying access to Pearl 
Roundabout, showing once again their continued use of nonviolent and indiscriminate 
tactics.  
 This day saw the first condemnation, not of the Bahraini regime per se, but rather 
of their security forces’ choice of weaponry, as Ms. Pillay, the United Nation’s former 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, heavily censured the use of military-grade 
101 Ibid.   
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shotguns against peaceful protesters.104 There was a clear-cut attempt not to criticize the 
actual government of Bahrain but merely slap them on the wrist by announcing that the 
international community disapproved of this type of aggression towards its citizens who 
were actively involved in protesting. This statement is classified as a cheap signal as it 
simply articulated that this type of force was not tolerable to various member states 
within the UN. Also, airing on February 18th was former Secretary of State, Hillary 
Clinton’s interview with ABC’s This Week host, Christiane Amanpour. In an attempt to 
get a straight answer out of Secretary Clinton, Mrs. Amanpour tried to pin her in a corner 
when she asked the taboo question, “Will the United States condemn or hold Bahrain to 
the same standard as we saw them hold Egypt?” To which Secretary Clinton responded, 
“These are individual national events that respond to some of the same but often different 
impulses. And so we’ve repeatedly said we want to see reform go forward, we want to 
see it done peacefully, we want to see it inclusive, we want to see countries move toward 
democracy. And we will keep saying that.105 Essentially, perfecting the art of ‘beating-
around-the-bush’, she avoided publically criticizing their strategic ally in the Gulf. This 
signal is categorized as cheap and pro-government as it does not denounce the regime but 
rather shows the United State’s continued hopefulness in the Bahraini regime to achieve 
meaningful dialogue with its opposition to implement real change in the country.  
 
The Theme of Phase One of the Uprising  
 During this beginning stage, the most prevalent kind of repression that was 
utilized by the state’s security forces was indiscriminate and violent, alluding to the first 
theme of the uprising which is that the use of these types of repression tactics against 
civilians and unarmed demonstrators only succeeded in escalating the momentum of the 
protest movements. Although the riot police also carried out more selective measures as 
well to quell the emerging unrest, their excessive use of force against innocent 
bystanders, grieving civilians, medical personnel and resting protesters alongside their 
sleeping children caused mass outrage among the majority of Bahrainis which prompted 
104 United Nations, Department of Public Information, Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the 
Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, (SG/SM/13407, February 18, 2011).   
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them to take to the streets. Unlike selective repression techniques in which only active 
protest participants and their main collaborators are targeted, indiscriminate repression is 
carried out at a higher level of aggregation that cannot, or does not care to adequately 
differentiate between those involved in demonstrations and those who are not.106 The 
most frequent type of this kind of tactic throughout this period was indiscriminate 
repression that was directed at people simply by their location. The government ordered 
the security forces to use unnecessary force but when they dispersed teargas, rubber 
bullets and live ammunition upon people mourning during a funeral procession, against 
harmless citizens praying near Pearl Roundabout, on protesters deep in slumber and at 
doctors attempting to rescue the wounded it engendered mass amounts people which 
caused them to become anti-regime activists. In addition, these same violent tactics were 
perpetrated against peaceful protesters that only further added to the utter outrage of 
Bahrainis as citizens were merely exercising their right to freedom of assembly which did 
not warrant this kind of ferocious state response. Also, in almost all instances, the police 
and security forces resorted to the disproportionate use of teargas and rubber bullets to 
disband large crowds of demonstrators in a manner that did not take into account whether 
or not they would cause minimal or fatal injuries to the protesters. Lastly, opening fire on 
unarmed dissidents and defenseless bystanders when the military troops themselves were 
not subjected to any immediate threat of serious injury or death emphasizes the fact that 
they clearly should have used significantly less lethal means when confronting civilians.  
 The escalation theory of civil war onset predicts that when a regime’s security 
forces respond to initially nonviolent movements with such brutal measures it causes 
citizens to view regular channels for initiating political change as off-limits to them while 
concurrently adding to the grievances that they already have.107 Additionally, this theory 
states that protesters, in a last attempt to get the state to implement their desired changes, 
will mobilize a significant amount of the population to join them in their demonstrations. 
106 Philip Hultquist, "Rebel Threat, State Repression and the Intensity of Internal Armed Conflict: 
Unpacking Endogenous Escalation" (Paper presented at the International Studies Association, San Diego, 
CA, April 2012), 5.  
107  David A. Armstrong II., Christian Davenport and Mark I. Lichbach, "Conflict Escalation and the 
Origins of Civil War" (Working Paper, University of Maryland, 2006), 35-36. 
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This is precisely what occurred in the first stage of the Bahraini uprising as the protests 
which ensued on the 18th had the highest number of active participants recorded to date. 
The reason why thousands of citizens decided to join the rallies was to voice their strong 
condemnation against the regime’s ongoing use of violent and indiscriminate repression 
methods that were being used against unarmed demonstrators and harmless civilians in 
which they wanted justice for, in addition to remaining steadfast in calling on the 
government to meet their political, social and economic demands. Although it was 
surprising that the demonstrators had yet to resort to violent tactics that mirrored the 
regime’s despite the state’s increase in the use of violent and indiscriminate repression 
techniques.  What can account for this seemingly startling scenario is the use of cheap 
and pro-government signals from the international community, in spite of the escalating 
brutality, which sent a message to the regime’s oppositional forces that they would be 
willing to step in on behalf of the al-Khalifa family if the situation started to steer towards 
a path not to their liking. As on February 15th and 18th, statements were made from 
various UN and U.S. representatives that briefly acknowledged the rising tensions in the 
country but refused to overtly condemn the regime for violently suppressing unarmed 
demonstrators and only continued to announce their shared feeling of hopefulness that a 
national dialogue would take place to help end the ongoing unrest. This essentially 
signaled to the regime that they could continue responding to the protest movements with 
their usual tactics as the international community was not going to publically denounce 
their activities, giving them a type of ‘free-pass’ to put down the uprising by any means. 
 But the next moves of the ruling al-Khalifa family were very critical as they had 
the potential to escalate the momentum of the protests closer to the onset of civil war. It 
was during this period that the uprising most closely resembled that of Syria’s. Had the 
regime continued to increase their tactics of utilizing indiscriminate and violent 
repression with the hopes of halting the protest movements from gaining more strength it 
would have likely pushed activists towards more rebellious strategies to achieve their 
desired goals.108      
 
108 Mohammad M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 75.  
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Timeline of the Uprisings – Phase Two (February 19 – March 15)  
 The second stage of the uprising is characterized by the regime’s attempted efforts 
at offering mild concessions which were expected to bring about political quiescence. By 
utilizing a different, nonviolent approach, the government hoped that this would put an 
end to the ongoing unrest. In addition, during this period the number of signals that were 
sent in favor of the regime almost doubled as many praised King Hamad for taking the 
initiative in trying to mitigate the country’s internal strife by means of a national dialogue 
between the government and its main opposition to help steer Bahrain back towards 
regime stability.  
 This explains why on February 19th, under the strong influence of Crown Prince 
Salman, King Hamad ordered all military personnel to withdraw their troops from Pearl 
Roundabout. For around two whole weeks, the security forces were nowhere to be seen 
as they were instructed to allow the demonstrators to peacefully organize.109 Therefore, 
since it seemingly appeared that the government had finally decided to end its campaign 
of brutally suppressing all forms of dissent, citizens also did not feel compelled to revert 
to more violent styles of protest and thus they continued their use of pacific methods 
instead. Also on this day, the U.S. Department of State was overtly positive in their 
commendation towards the Bahraini regime’s new strategy of addressing its citizen’s 
grievances. Former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was ecstatic when she phoned 
Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal and articulated America’s optimism that 
Bahrain’s regional allies would also approve their new strategy of offering concessions 
that were in line with its peoples’ demands as a constructive path towards rebuilding the 
country back to its former stable self.110  This is classified as a cheap and supportive 
signal because it was made in favor of the al-Khalifa government and also encouraged 
surrounding countries to back the regime’s newfound efforts as well.  
 However, contrary to the regime’s belief that proposing minor concessions would 
decrease these kinds of activities, the number of people that attended the demonstrations 
109 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Bahrain (Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2012), 19.   
110  U.S. Department of State, Secretary Clinton’s Call with Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia (February 20, 
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at Pearl Roundabout on the 22nd reached a skyrocketing 150,000 participants.111 The 
main reason behind the growing momentum of the protest movements was the riot 
police’s barbaric use of force against defenseless demonstrators during the initial phase of 
the uprising. But despite this, on the same day, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon 
greeted King Hamad’s decision to engage in discussions with the country’s anti-regime 
demonstrators with open arms and announced that if requested, the United Nations would 
be ready to help implement this process.112 This statement qualifies as a cheap and 
supportive signal that borders on the verge of being a costly one as it alludes to the fact 
that the UN would be willing to aid Bahrain in reaching negotiations with its opposition.  
 On the next day, February 23rd, due to the escalation, King Hamad enacted further 
measures to appease civilians demands as he released 23 political activists from prison 
who had been detained since August 2010.113  In addition to this, he also announced that 
February 25th would be a national day of mourning for those that were killed during the 
uprising.114 
 However, on the morning of February 25th, the anticipated state-wide day of 
grievance was met with substantial anti-government demonstrations as almost 40% of the 
Bahraini population reportedly showed up to signify that they still wanted the officers 
responsible for injuring and killing the peaceful protesters to be held accountable for their 
actions, tried in a court of law and brought to justice and simply declaring a national day 
of mourning was not going to appease them.115 But the unwillingness of the regime to 
acknowledge these demands did not help their case as their continued inaction only 
further infuriated civilians. Despite this, King Hamad was still adamant that acceding to 
111 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
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some of the protesters’ demands would quell the uprising’s momentum which is why on 
the 26th he altered several cabinet positions that entailed removing two al-Khalifa family 
members from their posts to slightly reduce the royal clan’s dominance.116  The new 
associates filled the cabinet seats which had the power to improve people’s living 
conditions and create more job opportunities but this calculated move did not have a 
deterrent effect on the demonstrators who continued to turn out in large numbers.  
 Although these mild reforms did not stop the plethora of proclamations coming in 
from the international community as they continued to voice their staunch support for the 
Bahraini regime and for the next week only costly and cheap signals were sent in favor of 
the ruling al-Khalifa family. On March 2nd, the Gulf Cooperation Council unleashed their 
master plan to assist Oman and Bahrain in ending the domestic conflict going on in both 
their countries through massive aid packages that would provide better economic 
opportunities for all their citizens and was hoped to halt the large demonstrations from 
continuing to take place. An undisclosed source speaking on behalf of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council told Gulf News that, “The political regime in Bahrain has full 
support from the GCC countries.”117  By offering such large monetary installments to the 
Bahraini government sent a costly signal to their opposition that the GCC was going to 
maintain their patronage to their loyal member state no matter the price. On the following 
day, the U.S. Department of State sent out yet another press release describing how 
Bahrain has been a long-standing ally to America which is why they would remain 
committed to ensuring that the national dialogue with its citizens would result in some 
type of negotiated settlements.118 A few days later on March 10th, UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon again reiterated the United Nation’s readiness to provide material support 
to the nationally-led endeavors if they were invited to do so by the Bahraini regime and 
called on the country’s neighbors and the larger international community to also show 
their support for the dialogue process which was conducive for credible agreements to be 
116 Ibid, 92.   
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implemented in Bahrain.119 On this same day, the United Arab Emirates Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahayan, speaking on behalf of the GCC, 
emphasized their support for the continued peace talks and stated that the Council would, 
“Expect all Bahrainis will be willing to support this approach.”120 Both of these 
announcements from representatives of the UN and the GCC are grouped together and 
coded as cheap, pro-government signals as they were both sent to highlight these 
organizations backing of the Bahraini regime through their ongoing statements of support 
for their attempts at using nonviolent means to end hostilities.  
 But as the days progressed, it was clear to see that the national dialogue between 
the government and the main opposition group, al-Wifaq, had failed to achieve any 
meaningful negotiations. Up until this period, the protests had normally remained 
stationary at Pearl Roundabout, but on March 12th the demonstrators organized anti-
regime marches that headed towards the Royal Court in al-Riffa as well as the University 
of Bahrain, in attempts to spur the state into finally acting in their favor by implementing 
their multiplying demands.121 But both demonstrations ended violently as anti-regime 
protesters encountered regime supporters who were allegedly armed with sticks and 
knives and thus both sides began to attack one another. Further reports from this day also 
described how the anti-government demonstrators assaulted some students at the 
University of Bahrain and committed acts of vandalism as well.122 Although these two 
incidents do not fit under any repression category as the tactics were not carried out by 
the state but rather by two different protest groups against one another, it is still important 
to mention because it signifies how the uprising was starting to become more violent.  
 The next day, the demonstrators resumed their former peaceful activities, though 
they were becoming noticeably more disruptive, especially for citizens trying to carryout 
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their everyday errands as protesters began to block off the main roads in Manama, 
preventing anyone from passing through. In addition to this, they also started to occupy 
Bahrain’s Financial Harbor district, causing extreme distress for the ruling al-Khalifa 
family as they feared that important infrastructure would be damaged in retaliation. This 
prompted the regime to awaken the riot police from their slumber and send them in to 
mitigate the situation using their former tactics as teargas, rubber bullets and live 
ammunition were dispersed throughout the crowds of people blocking the main roads and 
against those at Pearl Roundabout.123 In both of these situations, the repression methods 
of the riot police are categorized as selective and violent as the people who were targeted 
were actively involved in protesting or were hindering others from passing through the 
central streets. Later on that night, King Hamad decided to seek guidance from his GCC 
neighbors on how to handle the unraveling state of affairs.  
 On March 15th, the King declared a 3-month ‘State of National Safety’ which 
essentially equipped the government with a wide range of capabilities to do as they 
pleased in order to protect the welfare of Bahrainis.124 This Royal Decree qualifies as a 
kind of nonviolent and indiscriminate repression tactic as it effected everyone in the 
country by restricting several of their basic civil liberties that were outlined under the 
various articles describing the powers of the government during this three-month period. 
In addition to this, the King also announced that he requested assistance from the GCC’s 
Joint Security Forces which were expected to arrive on the following day. This caused 
tensions to reach an all-time high as the majority of citizens were enraged at the fact that 
outside forces were granted the ability to meddle in the domestic affairs of Bahrain.125  
 As a result, numerous spouts of violence ensued throughout the day in several 
Shia villages that were put down by the riot police who responded to them in an identical 
fashion with teargas, rubber bullets and live ammunition, making these more cases in 
which violent and selective repression tactics were used. Reports also surfaced in which 
witnesses described how the security forces were aimlessly firing teargas and rubber 
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124 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Bahrain (Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2012), 1.   
125 “Bahrain: Eight Activists Detained in Bahrain,” Amnesty International, March 18, 2011.  
  
 71 
                                                     
bullets into a local medical center in Sitra as well as how they were launching teargas 
canisters into the Bahrain International Hospital without entering.126  Lastly, they also 
attacked several ambulances leaving Salmaniya hospital that were on their way to reach 
injured demonstrators at Pearl Roundabout.127 Each of these cases were grouped together 
and coded as incidents in which the regime’s security forces carried out indiscriminate 
and violent repression techniques as targeting hospital buildings is simply atrocious as is 
physically assaulting medical vehicles.  
 After the events of the day had concluded, the European Union High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, issued a 
formal statement that proclaimed the EU’s growing concern about the seriousness of the 
level of force being inflicted upon unarmed protesters on the central streets of Manama, 
the country’s capital city and their fears that the increasing sectarian rhetoric would only 
lead to more violence not only between the demonstrators themselves but also against the 
Bahraini security forces as well. But despite the government’s resumed use of violent 
repression tactics she still refrained from explicitly calling out the regime and continued 
to reiterate the recycled response, “I call on all the security forces present to respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. I urge all sides to take the necessary steps to 
create the conditions to allow serious, comprehensive and constructive dialogue to 
proceed without delay.” 128 This statement qualifies as a cheap supportive signal towards 
the ruling al-Khalifa family and the protesters as the announcement conveyed to both 
parties the EU’s hopefulness towards a nonviolent strategy to end the resumed 
aggression.   
 
Theme of Phase Two of the Uprising  
 Throughout this second phase, the use of state repression was hardly seen as King 
Hamad tried to show the protesters a sign of goodwill by ordering the state security 
forces to retreat from Pearl Roundabout. He hoped that offering mild concessions would 
126 “Bahrain: Injured People Denied Medical Care,” Human Rights Watch, March 17, 2011.  
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cause citizens to cease their current activities in exchange for resolving their issues with 
the regime through more discursive practices instead, but after citizens had witnessed the 
brutality inflicted on unarmed protesters and innocent civilians, their demands had 
multiplied and became more extreme than before. This brings attention to the next theme 
of the uprising which is that the attempted concessions failed to appease protesters ever-
growing demands causing their behavior to become more disruptive in nature that 
resulted in the regime’s return to violent, but more selective repression techniques to halt 
the rapidly increasing momentum of the protests. But the regime’s refusal to compromise 
with the opposition was also compounded by the fact that they had received an 
abundance of cheap, pro-government signals from multiple international, regional and 
domestic organizations that hindered their willingness to reach negotiations that were 
acceptable to all parties. Since it was in both the West and the GCC’s best strategic 
interests for the Bahraini regime to remain in power, they hoped their signals would 
influence the outcome of the settlements or at the very best influence the expectations of 
the regime’s main conflict protagonists from backing down on their demands to shape the 
outcome of the uprising to their liking.129 
 The dialogue that ensued between Crown Prince Salman and the largest 
opposition group, al-Wifaq, was thought to be the end-all solution that would finally 
bring the ongoing unrest to a close as this organization was believed to have the capacity 
to effectively articulate the specific desires of the demonstrators to the ruling family that 
would result in the establishment of mutually agreed upon negotiations. This ideal 
situation would have been more probable before the security forces violently suppressed 
peaceful demonstrators and civilians during the initial phase of the uprising as citizen’s 
demands were not so unfathomable for the regime at this point. The most common calls 
were for the establishment of a fully-elected parliament, an end to the gerrymandering of 
electoral districts to favor Sunnis over Shiites, better job opportunities for all Bahrainis 
and the removal of the hardline Prime Minister and member of the royal family, Sheikh 
Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, the world’s longest-serving premier, who has held this 
129 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Kyle Beardsley, “Nosy Neighbors: Third-Party Actors in Central 
American Conflicts,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 3 (2004): 379-402.  
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position since 1971.130  
 However, the uprising, which was originally incited by regional developments 
transformed overtime due to the sheer outrage many Bahrainis felt towards the regime 
after seeing the barbaric response from the security forces against the pacific movement 
that was starting to emerge.  Since indiscriminate and violent repression tactics were 
carried out against the citizenry it mobilized former inactive civilians to join in the 
dissident activities because of the rage that this type of violence provokes which gives 
people the motivation needed to join the cause and not fear the consequences of doing 
so.131 The original demands of the protesters started to escalate from mild constitutional 
reforms to more radical ultimatums such as the highly vocalized call for a republic.132  
These few, hesitant attempts towards formal agreements were short-lived as al-Wifaq 
refused to compromise on one of their main issues which was to establish a real 
constitutional monarchy, not simply the façade of one, where the Prime Minister and the 
rest of the cabinet members would be chosen by a fully elected parliament. Since the 
protesters wanted more from the regime than originally stated, the government became 
increasingly more unwilling to reach a compromise than before which resulted in the 
overall failure of the concessions as they no longer would please such a highly 
dissatisfied population.  
 While all of this was occurring, the uprising was continuing to gain a significant 
amount of supporters daily. The regime’s initial use of violent and indiscriminate 
repression was essentially responsible for brining about this second, larger wave of 
protesters to the streets, as an increasing percentage of the opposition started to believe 
that the government was neither legitimate nor capable of enacting any meaningful 
reforms.133  Feeling considerably threatened, the government lashed out by completely 
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ending discussions on the future possibility of reform and during the final days of this 
second stage, they ordered the security forces to resort back to their initial repression 
techniques. This meant that the ongoing demonstrations at Pearl Roundabout, the 
Financial Harbor district, throughout the main streets of Manama and in several Shia 
villages were once again met with loads of teargas, rubber bullets and an overabundance 
of live ammunition. Thus far, the path of the Bahraini uprising has continued to support 
the escalation theory of civil war onset as it emphasizes how the use of violent and 
indiscriminate repression against unarmed demonstrators and innocent civilians 
mobilized more than half of the population onto the streets to demand action and justice 
for those injured and killed by the regime’s security forces, although the dissidents at this 
point had yet to turn to more violent means to reach their goals.     
 The overall theme of the second phase of the Bahraini uprising highlights the fact 
that the failed concessions led to a return to the use of violent but more selective 
repression tactics. But the failure to reach any mutually acceptable concessions stemmed 
from the regime’s initial use of violent and indiscriminate repression tactics against 
peaceful protesters which escalated demonstrator’s demands to such an extent that the 
government was no longer willing to compromise, but in addition to this, what also 
influenced the al-Khalifa regime from refusing to negotiate was due to the cheap and 
costly supportive signals it received from the international community. For starters, after 
the GCC decided to give the country enormous concessions in the form of monetary 
payments that were anticipated to appease the majority of citizen’s grievances it sent a 
message to the opposition that the Bahraini government would have outside backing no 
matter what direction the protest movements took. Such costly signals require a very high 
level of commitment and generally work to deter regime dissidents from continuing to 
engage in their current tactics as the signaling parties show the opposition that they do 
not stand a chance if they continue to carry on with their calls to topple the regime.134  
 Also, the United Nations, European Union and U.S. Department of State 
repeatedly restated their commitment towards helping the Bahraini regime if necessary to 
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carry out a friendly national dialogue with its main dissidents so that the ongoing unrest 
would finally be put to bed. This sent a clear message to the protesters but their lingering 
disgust with the security forces initial use of indiscriminate and violent repression against 
unarmed demonstrators and innocent civilians hindered their willingness to accede on 
any of their demands against the regime.  But the government on the other hand, did not 
feel compelled to compromise on any of the oppositions terms to end the ongoing unrest 
because they felt that they had strong support from the international community due to 
the cheap, pro-government signals they continuously made.  Eventually, the dissidents 
started to realize in the third phase of the uprising that they would have to accept defeat 
as the signals being sent were not in their favor and the regime would likely triumph over 
them, especially combined with their new repression tactics that were more selective in 
nature.135 
 
Timeline of the Uprisings – Phase Three (March 16 – April 1)  
 On March 16th, around 1,500 members from the GCC’s Joint Security Forces 
arrived in Bahrain during the early morning. They were instructed to safeguard important 
government installations in the Financial Harbor district and were ordered to refrain from 
actively engaging with the protesters as this task was solely reserved for the Bahraini 
security forces.136 The riot police cleared Pearl Roundabout by dispersing copious 
amounts of teargas and rubber bullets while proceeding to open fire with live ammunition 
against any remaining demonstrators, making this another instance in which violent and 
selective repression tactics were used.137 The security forces also resumed more of their 
old tactics as they started to divert cars away from Salmaniya hospital and prevented 
ambulances there from entering or exiting to assist the multitude of wounded people 
scattered throughout the capital city. They also hijacked the patient ward at Salmaniya to 
further assault people with protest-related injuries and removed those requiring urgent 
medical treatment to restricted areas within the hospital that were being utilized as 
135Clayton Lynn Thyne, "Cheap Signals, Costly Consequences: How International Relations Affect Civil 
Conflict" (PhD. dissertation, University of Iowa, 2007), 31, 32. 
 
136 “Bahrain: Eight Activists Detained in Bahrain,” Amnesty International, March 18, 2011.  
  
137 “Bahrain: Injured People Denied Medical Care,” Human Rights Watch, March 17, 2011.   
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improvised torture sites.138 The first two cases are grouped together as indiscriminate and 
nonviolent repression methods as ambulances and civilians were prevented from either 
seeking or providing medical assistance. The second two cases are classified as instances 
of indiscriminate and violent repression as the security forces were assaulting the 
wounded and subjecting them to prolonged periods of suffering. Lastly, throughout the 
remainder of the day the state began its harshest crackdown yet against prominent 
political opponents and all suspected pro-democracy supporters by conducting nighttime 
raids on all households and detaining those who fit this criteria.139 These types of 
activities are branded as selective and nonviolent repression techniques as those who 
were imprisoned were some of the most well-known regime critics.  
 During the early hours of March 17th, the police continued to conduct their raids 
on several residences, looking for political community leaders and activists and taking 
them into custody.140 They also detained several members of a well-known sedition ring, 
a popular anti-government organization that regularly and publically would call for the 
downfall of the regime, demand immediate democratic reforms and remained staunchly 
critical of the recent crackdown, another case of selective and nonviolent repression.141 In 
addition, security forces were deployed throughout predominately Shia neighborhoods 
and villages that were close to the capital, Manama, to monitor the situation.142 Targeting 
whole cities because of their specific religious sect is a type of indiscriminate and 
nonviolent repression technique as people are under suspicious based on factors that have 
nothing to do with whether or not they were involved in the protest movements that were 
sweeping across the nation.  
138 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
(Presented in Manama, Bahrain, November 23, 2011), 201.   
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142 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report for 2011: Bahrain (Bureau of 
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 On March 18th, the government demolished the monument at Pearl Roundabout, a 
very symbolic move but nonetheless a case of nonviolent and selective repression as the 
statute was emblematic of the site where the beginning of the uprising began.143 The 
following day, security forces raided the home of Dr. Nada Dhaif and arrested her for 
appearing on an al-Jazeera broadcast speaking about the current events in the country.144 
This is classified as a case of selective and nonviolent repression because she was 
specifically detained for exercising her right to freedom of speech by discussing the 
situation in Bahrain which painted the regime in a negative light. On March 20th, another 
similar instance occurred as around 20 to 25 armed men alongside dozens of uniformed 
riot police went to the home Nabeel Rajab, the President of the Bahrain Center for 
Human Rights and a member of the Middle East advisory committee for Human Rights 
Watch, and broke down his door, confiscated some files as well as a computer and 
proceeded to take him into custody.145 Since he was arrested for his human rights work 
this is categorized as a case of selective and nonviolent repression. The next day, on the 
21st, a well-known opposition activist, Salah al-Khawaja was arrested, adding to the tally 
of instances of selective and nonviolent repression.146 
 These actions prompted Rupert Colville, the spokesperson for the United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to publically announce that the 
situation in Bahrain was getting very worrisome as he stated, “It is vital that the 
authorities scrupulously abide by international standards. People should not be arbitrarily 
arrested and should not be detained without clear evidence that they have committed a 
recognized crime. We stress again that demonstrating peacefully is not a crime. Giving an 
143 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
(Presented in Manama, Bahrain, November 23, 2011), 150.   
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interview to a journalist is not by any stretch of the imagination a crime, nor is reporting 
human rights abuses.”147 
 But by the end of the month, the regime had detained around 400 people and 
many were held in incommunicado detention as their whereabouts remained a mystery to 
their family and friends, and it was reported that only six of them had access to a lawyer 
before their trials.148 The nation-wide apprehension of the most prominent leaders of 
political opposition groups, citizens who were the main organizers of the protest 
movements as well as doctors, teachers and defense lawyers qualifies as  
selective/indiscriminate and nonviolent repression techniques, as certain people were 
arrested because of their highly public leadership roles that regularly were very critical of 
the regime rendering it as selective while others such as medical personnel were simply 
targeted for trying to save the injured make it indiscriminate as well.   
 By April 1st the Bahraini uprising had been crushed.   
 
Theme of Phase Three of the Uprising  
 The switch from indiscriminate and violent repression techniques to ones that 
were violent albeit more selective during the final phase of the uprising was one of the 
main reasons why the ruling al-Khalifa family was successful at returning the country 
back to regime stability. Also, the unexpected more frequent use of indiscriminate and 
nonviolent repression tactics also added to the country’s success in addition to the cheap 
and costly signals from external actors that remained in strong support of the regime. 
Therefore, the final theme is that a combination of all of these factors resulted in the 
government’s victory as they were finally able to put an end to the ongoing unrest.  
 The declaration of the State of National Safety which was applied on the 
population as a whole was a type of indiscriminate repression tactic as everyone was 
effected by it and during this period people’s right to freedom of assembly was severely 
restricted as gatherings of any kind were banned. The security forces were extremely 
relentless as all protesters at Pearl Roundabout were continually dispersed with teargas, 
147 United Nations, Department of Public Information, UN human rights office voices concern at recent 
events in Yemen, Bahrain and Syria (March 22, 2011). 
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rubber bullets and live ammunition. But on top of the government’s selective and violent 
measures to disband all demonstrations, they carried out a mass arrest campaign 
throughout the remainder of the month in which civilians who were only suspected of 
supporting the uprising were detained, in addition to doctors and other medical personnel 
who were arrested for treating those wounded during clashes with the regime. This is 
classified as indiscriminate and nonviolent repression as people were targeted based 
merely on suspicion that they sympathized with the protesters or secretly supported their 
activities. Also, taking doctors and nurses into custody for performing their duties of 
caring to those requiring medical care is another form of indiscriminate and nonviolent 
repression. Although the mass arrest campaign is also classified as selective and 
nonviolent repression as prominent government opponents, human rights activists and the 
most vocal regime critics were detained, the majority of those that were taken into 
custody either had no involvement in the demonstrations themselves or they simply 
supported their cause as well as the medical personnel who were also detained.  
 What was also taking place during the mass arrest campaign was a systematic 
purge of employees from various companies who were suspected of supporting the 
protest movements or participating in them. A June 29th news release from Human Rights 
Watch, reported that over 2,000 people had been fired from their jobs for allegedly being 
absent from work during and immediately after the period in which protests had taken 
place.149 But several of those interviewed said that according to law, in order for their 
employers to fire them, they would have had to be absent from work for 10 consecutive 
days and on the 5th day they were to receive a formal warning, however no one recalled 
getting any kind of written notice and several had only been gone from work for around 
two or three days. More reports also surfaced that stated that the University of Bahrain 
laid off around 100 faculty and staff members for supposedly attending the 
demonstrations. Lastly, at the beginning of April, it was recorded that at least 500 
students were suspended or expelled from their universities for supporting or actively 
participating in the uprising. Also, students that were studying abroad who had been 
involved in the protests had lost their government scholarships.150 All of these instances 
149 “Bahrain’s Human Rights Crisis,” Human Rights Watch, July 5, 2011.  
150 Ibid.  
 80 
                                                     
are grouped together and coded as cases of indiscriminate and nonviolent repression 
techniques as people lost their jobs, were banned from school and lost their scholarships 
for simply being suspected of involvement, supporting or sympathizing with the 
protesters and their demonstrations.  
  Finally, all four sources, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the U.S. 
State Department and the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, had no 
documented cases in which the GCC’s Joint Security Forces engaged with protesters by 
actively repressing them in any way, shape or form. They all described how these troops 
were specifically given orders to support the Bahraini authorities by guarding key 
government installations so they could carry out the task of brutally repressing their own 
citizens.151 They were also sent to protect the oil fields in the south of the country and 
were instructed to always be ready to defend Bahrain against any threat of foreign 
intervention.152 There were no concrete accounts in which the GCC’s troops had been the 
sole perpetrators behind suppressing Bahraini citizens, invalidating the claim that the 
regime was only able to defeat the uprising thanks to these forces as invalid.  But 
although they were not actively involved in brutally repressing the protest movements, 
the mere presence of the GCC forces may have had a mid deterring effect on the decision 
of protesters to not up their rebellious efforts towards engaging in violent conflict with 
the state.  
 This account of the events in Bahrain shows how the type and target of repression 
is an important component to take into consideration when attempting to predict the path 
of a conflict between a government and its citizens during an emerging uprising which 
can either metastasize into civil war onset or not. After thoroughly examining the 
dynamic interaction between the Bahraini regime and its citizens during the three distinct 
phases of the uprising it shows how the first hypothesis of this thesis is supported. 
Escalation theory of civil war onset states that the more indiscriminate and violent the 
repression tactics of a regime are, the more likely they are to up the intensity level of the 
 
151 “Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis,” Amnesty International, April 21, 2011.  
 
152 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 
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protest movements which was exactly what occurred after the first phase of the uprising. 
During the initial phase, the use of indiscriminate and violent repression methods caused 
the momentum of the protest movements to erupt on a massive scale as the targeting of 
civilians based not on their actions but rather because of where they lived, their religious 
beliefs or their proximity to an ongoing demonstration enraged a majority of the 
population which caused them to join in on the action.153 After this, the regime tried their 
hand at concessions but when that too proved unsuccessful they resorted back to their 
violent, but more selective repression tactics. In addition, it is important to note their 
widespread use of indiscriminate but nonviolent tactics during the final phase of the 
uprising, as several civilians were arrested, workers lost their jobs and students were 
dismissed from universities for their suspected involvement in or support of the protests. 
Data on Bahrain for the year 2011 was obtained from the Political Terror Scale which 
complies an annual report on the human rights practices of all governments with the 
primary goal being to measure the level of violence perpetrated by states. They code the 
level of political terror and violence that a country undergoes in a particular year based 
on a 5-level “terror scale” that was originally developed by Freedom House. Bahrain 
received a score of “3” which states that, “There is extensive political imprisonment, or a 
recent history of such imprisonment, execution or other political murders and brutality 
may be common, unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is 
accepted.”154 This grade of a level three emphasizes the fact that the Bahraini regime 
shifted its tactics away from ones that were indiscriminate and violent towards repression 
techniques that were violent but more selective alongside methods that were also 
indiscriminate but nonviolent in nature that significantly contributed to their ability to 
return the country back to its former stable state. The overall consensus here is that the 
type and target of repression carried out by the government’s security forces was key in 
153 Alexander B. Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of 
Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy,” Civil Wars 9, no. 4 (2007): 425.  
 
154 Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke and Daniel Arnon, The Political Terror Scale 
1976-2015 (2015), http://www.politicalterrorscale.org.  
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determining whether or not they would have a deterrent or backlash effect on the 
momentum of the protest movements.155  
  But what was also an important component that would effect the outcome of the 
uprising had to do with signals from external actors. The most common types of signals 
that the regime received from the international community were costly and cheap pro-
government ones that offered their verbal support for the ruling al-Khalifa family or gave 
them monetary aid to appease protesters growing demands. Signaling theory predicts that 
these types of signals from external actors will increase the likelihood that a regime and 
its opposition will reach a negotiated settlement to end the rising hostilities for several 
reasons. The first is that costly signals made in favor of the regime greatly impact its 
challenger’s decision to back down and not escalate their demands while forcing them to 
quietly bow out of any further conflict with the state. This is because costly signals that 
are sent as a sign of government support are highly visible for the opposition to see thus 
increasing their credibility and ensuring to them that outside forces would be willing to 
stand by the regime at all costs necessary. These third-party alliances signal to regime 
dissidents what to anticipate should they still decide to increase their internal strife with 
the state.156 Second, when pro-government cheap signals are made, although they are not 
as reliable as costly ones, it still causes the opposition to second guess whether or not 
they want to continue to carry out their activities against the regime and therefore they act 
as a deterrent mechanism. Any potential challengers become highly unlikely to initiate 
violent force against a government knowing that the rest of the international community 
is standing behind it.157 Therefore,  signals from external actors are important 
components which are influenced by the type and target of repression tactics carried out 
155 Philip Hultquist, "Rebel Threat, State Repression and the Intensity of Internal Armed Conflict: 
Unpacking Endogenous Escalation" (Paper presented at the International Studies Association, San Diego, 
CA, April 2012), 2.  
156 Brett Ashley Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the 
Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 3 (2003): 428-
429.  
157 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Kyle Beardsley, “Nosy Neighbors: Third-Party Actors in Central 
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by the regime that influences whether or not the momentum of protest movements will 
lead to civil war onset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 84 
CHAPTER 5: SYRIA  
 
 In 1963 the Syrian Arab Republic experienced a military coup that brought the 
Baath Party to power and they enacted the Emergency Law that would remain intact for 
the next 48 years to come. Under this state of “eternal lockdown” the government limited 
many basic rights of its citizens to maintain their complete dominance over society, in 
doing so they restricted public gatherings, authorized the supervision of personal 
communications, permitted media censorship and declared all independent political 
parties illegal.158 A few years later in a bloodless coup, General Hafez al-Assad assumed 
the office of the presidency. In order to eliminate his opponents, he went to great lengths 
to establish a rigid security apparatus which allowed him to sustain control of the 
population by severely suppressing all forms of dissent. After his death in late 2000, his 
son, Bashar al-Assad became the new President of Syria and continued to govern in 
manner that was similar to his late father, meaning that the regime still wielded absolute 
authority despite Bashar’s promises of reform. The government sustained the polices in 
place that significantly limited citizen’s right to freedom of expression, the ability to 
peacefully assemble and was believed to routinely torture political prisoners.159  
Therefore, once the Arab Spring uprisings broke out in Tunisia and Egypt, Bashar al-
Assad was overly confident that his country was immune to these kinds of protest 
movements. During an interview with the Wall Street Journal in January 2011, he stated, 
“We have more difficult circumstances than most of the Arab countries but in spite of 
that Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be very closely linked to the beliefs of the 
people. This is the core issue. When there is divergence between your policy and the 
people's beliefs and interests, you will have this vacuum that creates disturbance...Unless 
you understand the ideological aspect of the region, you cannot understand what is 
happening.”160 Ironically enough, it seems that Bashar was the one who was not in tune 
with his people’s own ideas and values as months later the country delved into a deadly 
158 Freedom House, “The World’s Most Repressive Regimes” (Special Report to the 59th Session of the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 2003), 75.  
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civil war which has persisted for five years now. Several have dubbed the ongoing crisis 
as possibly the worst humanitarian catastrophe since World War II, as it has left over a 
quarter million dead, nearly the same number of people missing or injured and at least 
half of Syria’s 22 million inhabitants displaced from their homes.161 
 
Background History  
 Many wondered how this exceedingly authoritarian regime fell victim to the Arab 
Spring uprisings after successfully ruling with an iron fist for so many years prior. 
Towards the end of 2010, the government was adamant about maintaining a watchful eye 
on the current unrest that was sweeping across the region and therefore they decided to 
implement a number of measures that were intended to appease the public while 
simultaneously improve their image. For starters, President Assad pardoned several 
people that had been convicted of major political offenses, attempted to ease economic 
hardships by boosting the subsidy on heating fuel and reduced taxes on basic 
commodities and lastly, he took small strides towards creating more job opportunities in 
both the public and private sectors.162 But while the regime was busy fine-tuning these 
new polices that they hoped would pre-empt a possible crisis, society was slowly but 
surely starting to fire up.  
 The Syrian uprising did not commence in the same fashion as other countries did 
where large demonstrations ensued in highly populated areas or capital cities. Instead, it 
came about as a quiet encroachment of small protests throughout provincial districts that 
each had their own specific grievances unique to their locality.163 The movements began 
spontaneously as they were not coordinated through online social media sites and bore no 
organizational structure. At first, they were relatively small in size, peaceful in nature and 
addressed legitimate, age-old tribulations that they finally wanted to see resolved. 
161 ECHO (EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection), “Fact Sheet: Syria Crisis,” European Commission, 
2016.  
162 International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian 
People’s Slow Motion Revolution” (Middle East/North Africa Report no. 108, July 6, 2011), 5-6. 
163 James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University 
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Although a few overarching themes could be seen within their demands, such as the 
persistent calls to end widespread government corruption, the desire to establish real 
democratic institutions, the implementation of long overdue economic reforms and an 
overall greater respect for the rule of law. Therefore, despite the considerable differences 
between the provinces, they had a shared sense of deep frustration with the regime that 
transcended across these disparate towns and gradually evolved into a national protest 
movement.164  
 Although the government was taking minor steps to entice its citizens, they were 
confronted with an unsettling situation as the society that they had long contained and 
regulated was suddenly behaving in a way that was completely unfamiliar to them. The 
regimes response to the localized protests was to treat every one as an isolated incident, 
employ a variety of superficial negotiations mixed with minor concession and top them 
off by brutally inhibiting any remaining oppositionists from organizing further 
demonstrations. But there was something different this time around, as the barbaric 
methods of the regime that, for so many years, worked in suppressing any form of 
dissent, was no longer working in their favor. Rather, the excessive use of force led 
residents of all localities to rise up in solidarity with the victims of state repression as 
they were outraged at the regime’s actions which led them to become active participants 
in the protest movements. Around this time, the demands of the people started to shift 
away from their specific grievances into a more general call to topple the regime.  
 But it still remains puzzling as to how one of the most consistently oppressive 
regimes failed to quell the momentum of the protest movements. Therefore, it provides 
for an interesting research opportunity to take an in-depth look at the specific kind of 
repression tactics that were utilized by the government’s security forces that led to civil 
war onset instead of regime stability. In carrying out this examination into the specific 
dynamics of the uprising, the data was collected following the same procedures that were 
used when gathering information on the Bahraini uprising. To refresh, the five sources 
that material was obtained from that explicitly had to do with the repression tactics of the 
Syrian regime are Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the U.S. State 
164 International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian 
People’s Slow Motion Revolution” (Middle East/North Africa Report no. 108, July 6, 2011), 11. 
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Department, the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and the 
Political Terror Scale. The material was coded accordingly and sorted into the same four, 
overarching categories of repression: violent, nonviolent, indiscriminate and selective. A 
chronological presentation of the events that took place will be given along with a 
systematic application of thematic analysis that will unmask the distinct kind of state 
repression techniques that had an escalatory effect on the momentum of the protest 
movements to see if the first hypothesis of this thesis is supported or not, which predicts 
that indiscriminate and violent repression will accelerate protest movements while 
selective and violent repression will end in a victory for the state. A thick description of 
the interactions between the state security forces and the demonstrators will be given to 
emphasize the phases and themes of the uprising that ultimately led to the onset of civil 
war.  
 
Timeline of the Uprising – Pre-Phase (January 29 – March 15)  
 
 Since the Syrian uprising did not begin in the same way as many others in the 
region did, it is important to understand the preceding events that led up to the first 
outbreak of protests. During this period, the government was very concerned with trying 
to pre-empt mass demonstrations from occurring as had happened in Egypt and Tunisia, 
which is why their main strategy was to offer concessions, closely monitor known 
oppositionists and attempt to persuade people from engaging in these type of activities. 
 Since the end of January, peaceful gatherings were held as a show of solidarity 
with the pro-democracy movements in Egypt and on almost all occasions security forces 
showed up to film and check identity papers in which they later used this information to 
contact those involved in these small congregations at their private residences to pressure 
them to stop attending these events.165  On February 2nd, the authorities arrested a man in 
his mid-70s, Ghassan al-Najjar, after he openly called for the Syrians in Aleppo to rise up 
and demand more rights.166 Two days later on the 4th, more than 10 well-known activists 
165 “Egypt-Inspired Protests Across Middle East Meet Violent Clampdown,” Human Rights Watch, 
February 8, 2011.  
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were summoned by police officers who insisted that they should refrain from organizing 
any type of demonstrations.167   
 In the first and third cases, although the regime did not exactly hinder people’s 
right to freedom of assembly, by attempting to coerce citizens to cease their activities 
acted as a warning sign of what was to come if they continued to disobey these wishes. 
But the second incident where a man was arrested for openly expressing his opinions and 
ideas violates his right to freedom of speech. Therefore, this is categorized as a type of 
nonviolent and selective repression tactic because he was specifically detained due to the 
public statement he made against the government and which they feared could incite a 
possible crisis for them. This was essentially how the pre-phase period to the protest 
movements occurred, as once civilians started to muster the courage to speak out against 
these long-standing oppressive measures, the regime’s security apparatuses were quick to 
pre-empt any situation from spiraling out of control.  
 But in the southwestern city of Dara’a on March 6th, the regime had taken their 
strategy of pre-empting all political opponents way too far as police arrested roughly 
fifteen school children between the ages of 10-15 for spray painting one of their school 
walls with the phrase, “The people want to topple the regime.”168 This sparked major 
outrage from Dara’a residents, especially the children’s parents, as they were only kids 
who were not intending to stage mass demonstrations themselves but were merely 
mimicking popular slogans from other Arab Spring uprisings. Therefore, although they 
were writing anti-regime sayings, this still qualifies as a kind of indiscriminate, not 
selective, repression tactic due to the innocence that comes with their young age as some 
could not even be considered as “pre-teens” yet. It is labeled as nonviolent for now 
because it was initially unfathomable that the security forces would have the audacity to 
inflict pain on harmless children.  
 
Timeline of the Uprising – Phase One (March 16 – April 7)  
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 This timeframe marks the initiation of the Syrian uprising although the protests 
remained mostly localized in one of Syria’s 14 governorates, Dara’a, a few 
demonstrations were held outside of this area as well. Since the government’s security 
apparatuses were not accustomed to dealing with citizen’s defiant behavior, as no one 
normally dared to speak out against the regime for fear of the consequences, they were 
ill-equipped with the knowledge needed to properly mitigate many of these early 
situations. Instead they resorted to their normal courses of action that they were used to 
when dealing with even the slightest form of dissent which was to contain the protest 
movements by all means necessary. This stage highlights how the regime’s repression 
techniques against peaceful protesters slowly started to evolve from nonviolent tactics to 
ones that were more aggressive and indiscriminate in nature which also caused the 
signals from external actors to shift as they began sending more signals expressing their 
deep concerns at the deteriorating situation in the country that were not in favor of the 
regime.  
 A little over a week later on March 16th, around 150 human rights activists and 
relatives of detainees congregated outside the Ministry of Interior in Damascus to 
publically demand the release of the country’s political prisoners but within a matter a 
minutes, security forces disguised in plain clothing began attacking them with batons. By 
the time that this rally had been dispersed, 34 people had been detained for their 
participation.169 This marked one of the first instances that the regime overtly violated 
people’s right to freedom of assembly by using violent and selective repression tactics as 
they publically assaulted protesters outside one of the government’s main institutions.  
 Two days later on the 18th, mass demonstrations were held in Dara’a to signify 
residents’ unity in their shared feeling of utmost repugnance at the government for not yet 
releasing the schoolboys who had been arrested two weeks earlier. The movement began 
after Friday morning prayers at al-Omari mosque and security officers initially began 
assaulting people with batons but when that failed to quell the rising tensions they 
methodically aimed water cannons directly into the crowd to disperse the protest. By the 
end of the day they had opened fire on unarmed demonstrators leaving a few killed and 
169 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Syria (Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2012), 16.  
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dozens injured. These actions are all categorized as violent and selective repression 
techniques as protesters were the ones being targeted with violent force. While all of this 
was happening, other military troops were dispatched to Dara’a to seal of the city, 
allowing people to leave but prohibiting anyone from entering.170 This was one of the 
regime’s beliefs that by restricting people’s access to Dara’a they could avert political 
chaos from spreading elsewhere throughout the country. It also qualifies as a type of 
indiscriminate and nonviolent repression method as all Syrians, not just a select few, 
were prevented from entering the city, thus hindering their ability to move freely as they 
please. Additionally, as a gesture of goodwill, the 15 school children were finally 
released to their families after spending nearly two weeks in jail.  But what was hoped to 
end the mounting animosity towards the al-Assad regime, only inflamed the already tense 
situation, as the mere sight of the children’s severely beaten, bruised and burned bodies 
was the fuel that sparked the protest movements to grow like wildfire. Therefore, this is 
why the original categorization of their arrest as a case of nonviolent and indiscriminate 
repression is now classified as indiscriminate and violent because their disfigured 
physiques clearly showed that they had been extensively tortured during their 
incarceration.171  
 As the day came to a close, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made one of 
his first public announcements addressing the current situation in Syria. He stressed that 
the use of such deadly force against peaceful protesters and their capricious arrests would 
not be tolerated which is why he strongly urged the Syrian authorities to cease these types 
of actions against their own citizens immediately.172 This is classified as a neutral cheap 
signal as it was not openly condemning the Syrian regime’s security forces activities but 
rather served as a warning sign to them if they failed to take this advice into serious 
consideration.  
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 On the 19th, thousands attended a funeral procession in Dara’a for two 
demonstrators that had been killed the day prior. But the police and military forces feared 
that such a large gathering of people would metastasize into another mass protest which 
is why they decided to discharge teargas on those in mourning. This use of unnecessary 
force against grieving civilians is classified as an instance of indiscriminate and violent 
repression. To add insult to injury, the government also disconnected all phone services 
throughout the entire city, both landlines and cell phones included, although they were 
restored later on the next day.173 Preventing everyone in a specific town from being able 
to communicate with others residing outside of their area is a kind of indiscriminate and 
nonviolent repression tactic as their right to contact people at their own discretion is 
inhibited.  
 After the school children had been released and residents not only witnessed but 
were subjected to the brutality of the Syrian regime’s security forces, the situation in 
Dara’a rapidly began to escalate. On the 20th rallies were staged throughout the city 
which were met with copious amounts of teargas and live ammunition from police 
officers and military troops, making this yet another instance where they security forces 
utilized selective and violent repression techniques to disband protest movements.174 In 
addition, the government also started cracking down on people who were reaching out to 
foreign news media outlets to describe the current situation. During this day as well, they 
detained a man named Rami Sulayman, from a neighboring town of Dara’a for calling 
the BBC news station to describe the unraveling crisis and two days later on the 22nd, a 
similar incident occurred as Louay Hussein was arrested for his online activities in which 
he was prompting Syrians to actively take to the streets.175 Both of these arrests are 
grouped together as instances of nonviolent and selective repression as the government 
was restricting their freedom of communication through various mediums such as online 
social forums or highly broadcasted international reports.  
173 “Syria: Government Crackdown Leads to Protester Deaths,” Human Rights Watch, March 21, 2011. 
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 On this day as well, the European Union decided to actively speak out against 
Bashar al-Assad’s government as they openly condemned the security forces violent 
repression tactics, specifically citing their disgust at the use of live ammunition against 
unarmed demonstrators.176 The press release also called on the Syrian authorities to halt 
their use of such brutal aggression towards their own citizens and opt for a more 
nonviolent approach to address their grievances instead of taking up arms against 
innocent civilians. This public announcement qualifies as a cheap and anti-regime signal 
as the whole European Union overtly denounced the actions of the regime’s troops. 
 Midday on the 23rd, residents of Dara’a were gathered together in the al-Omari 
mosque that was being used as a makeshift hospital for the wounded at the time when 
security forces hurled teargas canisters inside and proceeded to enter while open firing on 
everyone inside, resulting in 8 deaths, one of which was a child.177 Physically harming 
people while they are first of all not involved in protesting at the time of attack, second of 
all are tending to the injured and third of all are in a place of worship qualifies as a clear-
cut case of indiscriminate and violent repression. Later in the evening, more protests 
erupted throughout the city and in the outskirts of town in small villages and both were 
met with teargas and live ammunition once again, adding this to the tally of the number 
of times the government’s security services resorted to selective and violent repression 
techniques.178  
 The more protests that began taking place in the city of Dara’a the more the 
security forces were instructed to use indiscriminate and violent repression tactics to 
contain the rallies from spreading else where throughout the country. But unlike the 
uprising in Bahrain, the situation in Syria was put on everyone’s global radar as many 
more international, regional and domestic organizations started to comment on the 
unraveling crisis. On March 23rd, the Secretary-General issued his second condemnation 
176 European Union, Declaration by High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the EU on the 
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against the violent force being inflicted upon the peaceful demonstrators in Dara’a and 
called for an instant investigation to take place to hold those responsible for the killings 
accountable for such atrocities.179 Additionally, the U.S. Department of State issued a 
public statement also condemning the al-Assad regime while simultaneously expressing 
their most sincere condolences to the families who had lost their loved ones due to the 
violent repression tactics of the government’s security forces.180 Both of these are 
grouped together and coded as instances in which cheap, anti-regime signals were sent 
against the reigning al-Assad family as the comments were clearly not made in favor of 
the government.  
 In Dara’a on the 25th, funerals were being held for civilians that had been slain by 
the regime’s forces and people from one of Dara’a’s three districts, Sanamein, attempted 
to enter the city to pay their respects alongside tens of thousands of mourners already in 
attendance. But on their way there they encountered troops who were blocking them from 
continuing on their way and when they refused to stop they opened fire on all of them.181 
These more frequent uses of indiscriminate and violent repression tactics being carried 
out by the government’s military, police and security services shows how they began 
escalating their techniques as more and more incidents like this one were occurring on an 
almost daily basis in which unarmed civilians who were not actively engaged in 
protesting at the time of attack were targeted. Also during this time, citizens started to 
behave in a more aggressive manner, as two incidents were reported, the first in which a 
few protesters tried to destroy a statue of the former President, Hafez al-Assad and the 
second which occurred a day later on the 26th where demonstrators attempted to set 
ablaze the headquarters of the ruling Baath Party and a police station.182 This highlights 
how the dynamic interaction between the regime and protesters began to escalate as both 
were now becoming more aggressive towards one another, not just simply the 
government anymore.  
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 By the end of the month, around 93 citizens were detained and being held 
incommunicado detention and at least 99 people were reported to have been killed by the 
government’s security apparatuses.183 
 On the first day of April, demonstrations were held in other areas outside of 
Dara’a, showing how the uprising was gaining more momentum as protests began 
spreading to various parts of the country. In the city of Douma, in the Damascus 
governorate, police and mukhabarat forces responded to a rally by launching teargas 
canisters into the massive crowds of people and opened fire at the nonviolent 
demonstrators, resulting in at least 8 known casualties.184 The continued use of violent 
force against peaceful protesters are more instances that are characterized as the use of 
selective and violent repression tactics as they are aimed at people who are merely trying 
to exercise their right to freedom of assembly.  
 
Theme of Phase One of the Uprising  
 The first theme of the Syrian uprising is very similar to that of Bahrain’s, as this 
period emphasized how the regime’s repression tactics began to shift away from more 
nonviolent methods in favor of ones that were aggressive and indiscriminate in nature but 
that also only succeeded in upping the momentum of the protest movements. But it was 
dissimilar to the uprising in Bahrain regarding the signals from external actors as most of 
the international community was much quicker to condemn the al-Assad regime’s 
security forces actions than they were in Bahrain.  
 It was around March 18th that the demonstrations really started to take off as 
Dara’a residents were demanding the release of the schoolboys who had been detained 
two weeks earlier. The al-Assad regime decided that it would be in their best interest to 
free the boys and send them back home to their families. However, when their parents 
saw them for the first time since their arrest, it sparked mass outrage as their bodies 
showed signs of prolonged and severe torture. Shortly thereafter, the protests started 
multiplying daily as citizens were not only calling on the government to meet all of their 
183 “Syria: Further Information: Protestors released but Many still at Risk,” Amnesty International, March 
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political, economic and social needs, they now also demanded justice for the atrocities 
that were committed against defenseless children. As the regime was determined to keep 
these bouts of dissent localized to the city of Dara’a, the security forces were instructed to 
use any means necessary to do so, which is why during the following weeks their use of 
violent and indiscriminate repression tactics were becoming more widespread. Policemen 
and military troops systematically opened fire on people attending funeral processions, in 
places of worship and against unarmed civilians who were simply attempting to reach 
their friends and loved ones in Dara’a. These more frequent uses of indiscriminate and 
violent repression techniques are comparable to the tactics used by the security forces in 
Bahrain during the beginning phase of their uprising as well. In both cases, each 
government’s use of these kind of repression methods only worked in escalating the 
energy of the protest movements as more and more civilians became active participants.  
 Although it is important to point out that the Syrian government utilized far 
crueler violent and indiscriminate repression tactics in addition to harsher nonviolent and 
indiscriminate methods as well when compared to what the Bahraini authorities carried 
out. The al-Khalifa family did not purposely target, detain and torture children or order 
blockades to be imposed around whole cities, preventing civilians from entering or 
exiting, as the al-Assad regime did. This is why there were a few documented incidents in 
which protesters were behaving violently, albeit not directly against the security forces 
but against more emblematic sites and places as they attempted to demolish a statue of 
the former President, Hafez al-Assad and attempted to set fire to the Baath Party’s main 
office as well as a police station.  This signifies how the dynamic interaction between the 
regime and its dissidents began to escalate as both were now becoming increasingly more 
aggressive towards one another. These limited occurrences foreshadowed the violence 
that would eventually ensue between the al-Assad government and its citizens, as 
indiscriminate repression tends to push protesters towards more militant strategies to 
achieve their desired goals and a state that continues to cast the net of repression widely 
is more and more likely to be viewed as illegitimate.185  Also, this stage highlights how 
185 Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wictorowicz, “Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic 
Movement,” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wictorowicz 
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the use of indiscriminate and violent repression caused more protests to erupt in small 
villages on the outskirts of Dara’a. Especially since by April 1st, the first large-scale 
rallies were held outside of this location and every single one was met with an over 
abundant use of violent force as the police and mukhabarat launched teargas canisters, 
rubber bullets and opened fire with live ammunition at all participants. This follows the 
hypothesized direction of protest movements according to escalation theory as the more 
indiscriminate the repression tactics of a regime are, the more likely it is to create 
incentives for mobilization.186  
 What is also important to address in the first theme of the Syrian uprising is how 
prominent external actors and international governmental organizations denounced the 
actions of the al-Assad regime in a much quicker fashion when compared to their initial 
responses to the reigning al-Khalifa family’s activities during the beginning stages of the 
uprising in Bahrain. Within a timeframe just short of a week, the United Nations, 
European Union and U.S. Department of State had all publically condemned the Syrian 
government and some expressed their deepest condolences to the families who had lost 
their loved ones to do the rising escalation of violence. They had also called to attention 
that the use of such force would not be tolerated by members of the global community or 
within their home states but when looking at their announcements towards Bahrain, they 
merely expressed mild concerns and hoped that a national dialogue would take place 
between the country’s leaders and its main opposition. But the repression tactics of the 
ruling al-Assad regime during this first phase of the uprising were slightly more violent 
and indiscriminate than the Bahraini regimes were which caused an increase in the 
number of cheap anti-government signals to be sent against the Syrian government thus 
effecting the rate of escalation as dissidents began to notice that the regime did not 
seemingly have the support or backing from powerful international figures and therefore 
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began to up their demands.187 In a final attempt to ultimately spur potential challengers 
into submission the Syrian regime increased the brutality against protesters to a new 
level, as they were clearly not willing to offer any meaningful concessions in the near 
future. 
 
Timeline of the Uprising – Phase Two (April 8 –April 24)   
 This stage marked a turning point as the Syrian regime’s repression tactics 
became exceedingly brutal and more indiscriminate than before which in turn effected the 
momentum of the protest movements as they started to spread into neighboring 
governorates to the south and west of Dara’a. It was during this period as well that the 
signals from external actors were seldom as they were waiting to see if Bashar al-Assad 
would adhere to their previous advice and switch his security forces methods towards 
more nonviolent ones when dealing with the unarmed demonstrators.  
 A week later on April 8th, large demonstrations were held in two of the main 
villages in Dara’a, al-Mahatta and al-Balad. In both instances, the security service 
members responded with their usual tactics by tossing teargas canisters and opening fire 
into the large crowds of people.188 But their weapon of choice this time to shoot at 
unarmed demonstrators was with Kalashnikovs, a lethal assault riffle that can either be 
set to single or automatic shot mode and when it is operating in the latter it can be fired at 
a rate of 600 rounds per minute although it can only hold up to 30 rounds at a time which 
will empty in just over 3 seconds.189 Snipers were also systematically positioned 
throughout the area discharging their weapons at unsuspecting victims. The regime’s 
decision to have the security forces use this type of lethal weaponry against defenseless 
protesters and have snipers deployed in the city is a primary example of how their 
selective and violent repression tactics began to spiral out of control. In addition to this, 
the troops set up a major roadblock on one of the main bridges between the two villages 
187 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Kyle Beardsley, “Nosy Neighbors: Third-Party Actors in Central 
American Conflicts,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 3 (2004): 379.  
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to prevent people from crossing over to reach one another. They also stopped all 
ambulances that were sent to the scene to retrieve the injured from doing so and 
surrounded several hospitals in the area, inhibiting people requiring urgent medical 
treatment to get the help they so desperately needed. Restricting people’s freedom of 
movement, preventing medical personnel from tending to the wounded and stopping 
citizens that were hurt from entering hospitals are all categorized as indiscriminate and 
nonviolent repression tactics as those who were targeted were not actively engaged in 
protesting but were either simply trying to move about freely, perform their job’s duties 
or receive medical assistance.  
 On the same day in Douma, officers sealed off the whole city, stopping anyone 
from entering or exiting because they feared that the events happening in Dara’a would 
provoke citizens in this town to follow suit as they had recently engaged in small scale 
protests themselves only a week earlier. Again, an instance of indiscriminate and 
nonviolent repression as everyone was either prevented from entering or leaving a 
specific area, although there were various accounts that stated the officers used violent 
tactics as well to stop people from passing through the town.  
 In one account, a witness told Human Rights Watch that three men all on one 
motorcycle reached the entrance of Douma only to encounter a large group of riot control 
units from the security forces who proceeded to tell them to turn around and go on their 
way. They followed orders and began to do so when all of a sudden one of the 
servicemen shot at them with his pistol.190 This repression method in this case is branded 
as indiscriminate and violent as a security member discharged his weapon against people 
who were abiding by their commands and who posed no imminent danger to their lives.  
In another testimony, two doctors from Harasta, a suburb of Douma, told Human Rights 
Watch that they had tended to several protesters within the last few days as well as 
countless injured civilians, all of which had bullet wounds lodged in various parts of their 
bodies and many of them were also children.191 This shows how the repression tactics of 
the government were remaining extremely violent and becoming more and more 
190 “Syria: Security Forces Barring Protesters from Medical Care,” Human Rights Watch, April 12, 2011. 
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indiscriminate as not only protesters, but civilian bystanders and even children were hit 
with live ammunition.  
 The following day, on April 9th in the western governorate of Tartus, the regime’s 
troops besieged yet another town, the coastal city of Banias as they set up multiple 
checkpoints to control the entry and exit to the city and in addition, they also decided to 
cut off all water supplies and electricity as well.192 After the events of the previous day, 
the government feared that people would start revolting here as they had begun to in 
Douma which is why they hoped this would pre-empt any attempted demonstrations from 
arising here. Hindering access to a city is, as previously stated, a type of indiscriminate 
and nonviolent repression method but it highlights how the government was applying 
harsher measures in doing so by stopping citizen’s from having basic necessities such as 
water and electricity. By the end of the day, the European Union’s High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, spoke on their behalf when 
she proclaimed, "I strongly condemn the continuing violence and deaths in Syria in the 
context of protests calling for freedom and democracy. I sincerely regret the loss of life, 
particularly in the Southern city of Daraa, and extend my condolences to the families of 
the victims. I urge in the strongest terms the Syrian authorities to immediately put an end 
to the violence.”193 This statement is a cheap, anti-regime signal as the EU wanted to 
voice their unwavering stance against the repression tactics of the al-Assad regime by 
publically denouncing their activities once again.  
 Out of sheer panic, on the 21st, President Assad issued decrees to finally lift the 
State of Emergency that had been in place for 48 years, eradicate the state security courts 
and to officially recognize and regulate citizen’s right to peacefully assemble.194 But 
what he had sneakily added to these seemingly groundbreaking concessions was a final 
decree that allowed the security forces to hold a person who was suspected to be involved 
in certain crimes against the state from 1 to 7 days before allowing them access to a 
192 “Syria: Rein in Security Forces After Violent Crackdown,” Amnesty International, April 14, 2011.  
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lawyer. These last-ditch efforts to appease the population was too little too late, as 
citizens had already witnessed the brutality of the regime’s security forces and no one 
truly believed that anything was going to change for the better.195 
 The next day, thousands of people in various parts of the country took to the 
streets showing that the concessions offered by the al-Assad regime were merely 
cosmetic in their minds and what they actually wanted was real reform not just simply the 
façade of change, in addition to justice for those who had been killed by the security 
forces while they were peacefully protesting. But not surprisingly, the government troops 
responded to the mass demonstrations that erupted in Douma, Homs, Damascus and 
Maadamiya by opening fire into the large crowds of people and in Khalidiyyah, a 
neighborhood in Homs, it was reported that military personnel were using Kalashnikovs 
to shoot at protesters.196 In all of these cases, this type of brutal force is classified as 
violent and selective repression techniques as all of those who were targeted were 
actively engaged in protesting at the time of attack. In Ezraa, one of the three districts of 
the Dara’a governorate, witnesses described an incident in which officers were sniping 
victims from the top of a building which resulted in the death of a 7-year-old child along 
with three other young boys who were also hit in the head and died instantaneously. In 
the suburb of Othman, a witness told Human Rights Watch that they saw a 23-year-old 
man attempting to return home when mukhabarat forces told him to halt and as he 
proceeded to get off his bike, they shot him directly in the head.197 Both of these 
instances qualify as indiscriminate and violent repression as those who were targeted 
were only children or merely trying to get home to their families when they were 
assaulted by these barbaric acts.  
 On the 23rd in Harasta, a neighborhood in the Douma district, peaceful 
demonstrations started to occur but were disbanded by the regime’s security services who 
proceeded to open fire at the unarmed participants which qualifies this as an instance of 
violent and selective repression. But months later, a former member of the Syrian 
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Republic Guard named Walid ‘Abd al-Karim al-Qash’ami told Amnesty International 
that he was condemned to death in Syria as he refused to shoot at protesters on this day 
after witnessing soldiers indiscriminately execute three children and a young man and 
women. He said, “One of the children was shot in the head by an officer who was 
standing right in front of me. I heard the officer say that he shot the kid because he was 
annoyed with his constant crying.”198 During this day, funeral processions were held in 
Douma, Barza and Ezraa and those in mourning were shot at by the regime’s security 
forces, branding this as another act of indiscriminate and violent repression as people 
were targeted while they were paying their respects for those they had lost.199 
 
Theme of Phase Two of the Uprising 
 The theme of this stage of the uprising is that the indiscriminate and violent 
repression tactics of the Syrian regime became even more exceedingly brutal than before 
which in turn caused the one thing the government feared the most to happen, which is 
that the protest movements spread even further into neighboring governorates and not just 
in nearby villages of Dara’a anymore. Throughout this phase, the security forces methods 
for disbanding protests were similar to the Bahraini regimes security forces although as 
time progressed, the Syrian government decided to use lethal weaponry and snipers 
against demonstrators and eventually on unsuspecting civilians as well. But the signals 
from external actors were few and far during this phase as it acted as a kind of incubation 
period because the international community was waiting to see if the Syrian regime 
would adhere to their advice as the Bahraini regime did during the first portion of the 
second phase of their uprising.  
 At first, the police and military troops consistently resorted to launching teargas 
canisters into large crowds of people and opened fire with live ammunition, which was in 
line with the tactics utilized by the Bahraini security forces. They also prevented 
ambulances from reaching the wounded and injured civilians from entering hospitals to 
receive medical treatment which was also comparable to the methods employed in 
Bahrain. But on April 8th, the regime’s security apparatuses used deadly assault rifles, 
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Kalashnikovs, to fire at unarmed demonstrators and innocent civilians who were 
approaching them, in addition to snipers who were shooting at unwary protesters and 
citizens throughout the day. The al-Assad regime’s unwavering decision to use this kind 
of lethal weaponry against peaceful protesters and innocent civilians, on top of having 
snipers methodically placed throughout towns clearly highlights how the indiscriminate 
and violent repression tactics began to inch towards the point of no return. But despite 
this aggressive use of violent force against them, Syrians were unrelenting as these tactics 
only continued to enflame their rage towards the regime, especially at the ease in which 
the regime carried out such gross violations of human rights and other unspeakable 
atrocities against civilians, young children and the elderly.  
 The security forces use of indiscriminate and violent repression was evolving into 
a clear, patterned reaction as reports began to multiply which thoroughly described how 
these troops were either aimlessly firing on civilians, shooting directly at people who 
were trying to obey their orders or killing people simply because they were on their 
nerves. Also, several doctors relived the days when they received many dead bodies, all 
of which had been shot many times and several of the corpses they got were of young 
children, further elucidating the regime’s lack of basic humanity. Finally, President Assad 
attempted to offer concessions in hopes of halting the rapidly increasing momentum of 
the uprising, but as in the same case of Bahrain, they did little to appease the population 
as they had already born witness to the atrocities the regime was capable of and 
demanded justice for those injured and killed. Therefore, although the Bahraini and 
Syrian regimes both initially responded to the protest movements with violent aggression 
that was mostly indiscriminate in nature, overtime the tactics of al-Assad’s security 
forces became increasingly more deadly and widespread whereas the Bahraini 
government at least tried harder to offer meaningful concessions to its citizens. It is 
during this phase in which the repression techniques of both regimes initially start to shift 
further away from one another. As this stage of the uprising came to a close, although 
external actors only rarely took a position during this period, the signals that were sent 
were all cheap, anti-regime ones that overtly condemned the actions of the al-Assad 
government. This foreshadowed what was to come in the final stage of the uprising 
which would highlight how the increase in the use of indiscriminate and violent 
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repression tactics prompted external actors to send a multitude of cheap anti-government 
signals that increased the likelihood that mutual negotiations would be reached between 
the government and its opposition. According to signaling theory, cheap signals matter in 
bargaining processes and normally, when third parties offer cheap signals in favor of the 
government, it is the oppositional forces that accede some of their demands which gives 
the regime the upper hand.200 But in this case, as the signals that were sent were more in 
favor of the opposition, it decreased their willingness to bargain with the government and 
opt for incurring the costs of engaging in violent conflict with the regime instead.  
 
Timeline of the Uprising – Phase Three (April 25–September 30)  
 It was during this stage of the uprising that the regime’s indiscriminate and 
violent repression tactics had reached their apex, as the protest movements had spread 
beyond the localized provinces and into several surrounding cities throughout the 
country. The security forces met all the demonstrations with the same exceedingly 
sadistic measures that they were used to employing before when they successfully 
eliminated any traces of government opposition. It was also during this stage that external 
actors became remarkably vocal in their condemnation of the al-Assad regime as they 
started to threaten them with sanctions as well as alluding to the fact that the international 
community was willing to aid the anti-government forces should push come to shove.  
 On April 25th, severe anguish consumed Syria as the security officers unleashed 
their most oppressive tactics to date. They completely encapsulated the city of Dara’a by 
occupying every neighborhood within the city and ordered everyone to remain inside 
their homes which had their electricity, internet and phone services totally cut off.201 This 
siege lasted for 11 days straight, during which all humanitarian aid, such as copious 
supplies of medicine and food, were also prevented from reaching the residents. All of 
these actions are grouped as indiscriminate and nonviolent repression tactics as a whole 
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city was prevented from freely moving about, in addition to being denied the right to 
have basic necessities available to them such as water and electricity, as well as 
restricting people from brining them humanitarian supplies to ease the burden of being 
under government lockdown. To top it all off, snipers were stationed with heavy machine 
guns all around the city on top of buildings that were instructed to open fire on anyone 
approaching them or those who dared to defy the ban on movement and chose to leave 
their houses.202  This qualifies as indiscriminate and violent repression because shooting 
at innocent civilians for simply leaving their place of residence is not something that 
warrants this kind of brutal response from people’s own government.  
 On the 25th as well, the rapidly increasing levels of violent and indiscriminate 
repression prompted the UN Secretary-General to once again overtly denounce the brutal 
aggression being inflicted upon unarmed demonstrators, although he did acknowledge 
Bashar al-Assad’s lifting of the State of Emergency that had been in place for 48 years, 
he still adamantly maintained that an effective dialogue must be taken with the regime 
and its opposition immediately.203 Two days later on April 27th, various member states of 
the United Nations took to the floor to continue their criticism and condemnation of 
Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The United State’s representative to the UN called on the 
Syrian government to “change course now” and staunchly stated that the international 
community must stand behind this goal and if the violent repression was not 
instantaneously halted that America was going to implement a wide range of sanctions on 
the country. The United Kingdom’s representative to the UN, Mark Lyall Grant also 
condemned the regime without any reservation and said that his country was also 
considering targeted sanctions against specific high-ranking members of the Syrian 
regime if the violence did not end. Lastly, France’s representative, Gérard Araud, joined 
in on denouncing the actions of the Syrian government’s security forces against peaceful 
protesters, human rights activists and journalists. Several other country representatives 
voiced their disapproval of the regime’s repression tactics but did not outright condemn 
202 “Syria: Lift the Siege of Daraa,” Human Rights Watch, May 5, 2011.  
 
203 United Nations, Department of Public Information, Secretary-General Condemns Syria Killings, Calls 
for End to Violence (SG/SM/13521, April 25, 2011).  
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the government as a whole.204 Also on this day, the United States issued a press release 
which denounced in the strongest manner possible the repugnant repression techniques 
being utilized by the Syrian government on their own people while announcing that they 
were going to respond to the outrageous and continuing use of violent and indiscriminate 
repression with targeted sanctions.205 All of these statements are classified as cheap and 
anti-regime signals because they were openly and harshly critical of the al-Assad regime 
and the threatening of targeted sanctions fits under the category of cheap because it 
attempts to pressure Syria into getting in line with their demands or else face the 
consequences.  
 Four days later on the 29th, thousands from towns surrounding Dara’a attempted 
to break the blockade but as they reached the Sayda residence complex, the military 
forces ambushed them by indiscriminately firing live ammunition into the massive scores 
of civilians which in the end led to at least 40 known casualties that included women and 
children.206 The high number of fatalities on this day provoked President Obama to sign 
an Executive Order that imposed targeted sanctions against specific Syrian officials that 
had committed gross human rights abuses that were now occurring at an alarming rate 
throughout the entire country against the majority of the population.207 President Obama 
also condemned Bashar al-Assad’s regime for ignoring the calls to end the brutality 
against his own citizens. Also, the United Nations issued a public statement that 
unequivocally denounced the Syrian governments use of deadly force against unarmed 
protesters and criticized how they prevented demonstrators from having access to urgent 
medical treatment as well.208 These instances qualify as cheap and anti-regime signals 
204 United Nations, Department of Public Information, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Briefs 
Security Council on Syria, Says ‘Repression Is Not the Solution;’ Inclusive Dialogue, Reform Needed 
(SC/10235, April 27, 2011).  
 
205 U.S. Department of State, Remarks at a Security Council Briefing on Syria (April 27, 2011). 
 
206 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic (UN General Assembly, Seventeenth Special Session, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 
November 23, 2011), 11. 
 
207 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Executive Order Due to Syrian Human 
Rights Abuses (April 29, 2011).  
 
208 UN Human Rights Council Resolution S-16/1, The Current Human Rights Situation in the Syrian Arab 
Republic in the Context of Recent Events (A/HRC/S-16/1, April 29, 2011).   
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that were sent as restrictions were placed on various members of the al-Assad 
government, in addition to the ongoing condemnation of their atrocious actions.  
 It did not take long until the next press release from the U.S. Department of State 
to be released on May 6th, which once again condemned in the strongest possible terms 
the actions of the Syrian government over the course of the last month and a half. But 
unlike before, they started to up their threats as the announcement proclaimed that Bashar 
al-Assad’s security forces violent repression tactics were, “Neither those of a responsible 
government nor a credible member of the international community.”209 It also stated that 
the American government was willing and ready to work unilaterally and multilaterally 
with its international partners to develop a comprehensive plan that would be the most 
effective should the Syrian regime decide not to abandon its current violent path. This 
statement is classified as an extremely cheap, anti-government signal as it was one of the 
first instances in which the Syrian regime was described basically as illegitimate and 
foreshadowed what was to come as the country was seemingly not going to comply with 
the demands of the global community.  
 On May 7th, security forces entered the town of Tafas by firing aimlessly into the 
air in order to scare people into their homes and an incident occurred in which snipers 
stationed methodically on a rooftop opened fire on a group of civilians leaving the market 
place. Also, later in the day around 100 people tried to escape the village through 
Yarmuk valley but were hunted down like animals by military personnel who also 
proceeded to open fire on them.210 On May 9th, similar tactics were employed in Banias 
as security officers using tanks fired shells into the residential area of Ras al-Naba and 
killed four people.211 The incidents that occurred on both of these days are grouped 
together and classified as more cases in which the regimes many security apparatuses 
utilized indiscriminate and violent repression tactics against unarmed civilians.  
209 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary on Violence in Syria 
(May 6, 2011).  
 
210 “We’ve Never Seen Such Horror: Crimes Against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces,” Human Rights 
Watch, June 1, 2011.  
 
211 “Syria: Death Toll Rises as City is Placed Under Siege,” Amnesty International, May 9, 2011.  
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 In the Homs governorate district of Tell Kalakh on the 15th, a devastating 
campaign of violent and indiscriminate repression was carried out by the regime’s 
security forces as several atrocious incidents ranging from murder, torture, random 
arrests and severe denials of basic civil liberties were reported.212 All of these actions 
were taken deliberately to cause immense suffering to citizens mental and physical 
wellbeing. Around two weeks later on April 29th, the military forces again proceeded to 
march through the towns of Talbiseh, Deir Ba’albeh, Teir Ma’alleh and Rastan with tanks 
that had machine guns mounted on them which began shelling and shooting at civilian’s 
private residences.213   
 As the weeks progressed and the Syrian regime was not backing down or 
acceding to the calls from the global community to end their violent repression tactics 
against peaceful protesters and innocent civilians, various international organizations and 
heads of state actively denounced Bashar al-Assad’s government in numerous press 
releases and public speeches as well as taking concrete actions against the country by 
imposing more crippling sanctions. On May 18th, the European Union took drastic steps 
to attempt to get the Syrian regime to change their policies regarding the use of 
repression to subdue the ongoing demonstrations with the hopes of promoting a 
democratic process instead by implementing an arms embargo against the regime.214 The 
next day President Obama gave a very significant speech addressing U.S. policies in the 
Middle East and North Africa in which he made a number of statements that were 
extremely telling about America’s future intentions for the al-Assad regime. The usual 
condemnations were made against the security services use of force but what was 
different about this public announcement was that President Obama bluntly stated, 
“President Assad now has a choice: He can lead that transition, or get out of the way.”215  
212 “Crackdown in Syria: Terror in Tell Kalakh,” Amnesty International, July 2011.  
 
213 “We’ve Never Seen Such Horror: Crimes Against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces,” Human Rights 
Watch, June 1, 2011. 
  
214 European Union, Declaration by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Catherine Ashton, on Behalf of the European Union, on the Unfolding Situation in Syria (9512/2/11 REV 
2, May 18, 2011). 
 
215 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Obama’s Speech on U.S. Policies in Middle East and 
North Africa (May 19, 2011).  
 108 
                                                     
These two statements are characterized as cheap, anti-regime signals as they clearly were 
made against the al-Assad regime as both openly condemned the security forces atrocities 
and President Obama signaled that Assad was finished if he continued to carry on as so. 
A few days later on May 23rd, the European Union adopted new strategies hoped to 
effectively deal with Syria as the Union agreed to suspend all preparations that were 
being made regarding new bilateral cooperation programs with the country, in addition to 
suspending all current bilateral programs that were already in place under the European 
Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument that were tailored to help build relations 
specifically with Meditarianean countries.216 They also extended their restrictive 
measures to include more people close to the regime as well as President Bashar al-Assad 
himself. Finally, the EU proudly proclaimed that they would not be shy to take further 
action necessary should the leadership still continue to not change its current path.  
 Therefore, on June 2nd, President Bashar al-Assad announced the creation of the 
National Dialogue Commission that was tasked with the responsibility of preparing 
consultations between opposition groups but several boycotted this attempt at 
establishing a transitional process towards a multiparty democracy due to the continued 
violence used against nonviolent demonstrations and innocent civilians.217  
 During June 20th, protests were held in al-Khalidiyah but were met with teargas 
and live ammunition from the security forces which makes this an instance where violent 
and selective repression methods were used in attempts to quell the momentum of the 
movements from gaining any further strength.  
 Now although the regime was trying to act as if they were committed to ending 
the use of ongoing violence against demonstrators, on July 2nd, President Assad fired the 
governor of Hama, Ahmad Khalid Abdel Aziz, for for neglecting to repress a massive, 
peaceful protest at al-Assi square.218  
216 European Union, Foreign Affairs Council, Press Release (10440/11, May 23-24, 2011).  
 
217 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic (UN General Assembly, Seventeenth Special Session, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, 
November 23, 2011), 9.  
 
218 “Syria: Shootings, Arrests Follow Hama Protest,” Human Rights Watch, July 6, 2011.  
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 In the Qatana district of the Damascus governorate on July 16th, the regime 
resumed their indiscriminate and violent/nonviolent repression tactics by imposing an 
11AM curfew on all of the towns inhabitants, cut off their water and electricity and 
conducted house-by-house raids in which they arbitrarily arrested numerous people and 
continued to fire on residential areas injuring a number of civilians.219 Three days later on 
the 19th, pro-government militias and security forces targeted people attending a funeral 
near the Khalid bin al-Waleed mosque in Homs with automatic weapons that were 
mounted on top of vehicles. On the 21st, officers blocked of the village of Bab ‘Sba and 
opened fire at pedestrians trying to enter the town and reports surfaced that described 
how snipers shot at those on bicycle and others attempting to bring food and medicine to 
the residents.220 On this day as well, troops sealed off multiple neighborhoods throughout 
the Homs, restricting people’s freedom of movement, a kind of indiscriminate and 
nonviolent tactic that was so frequently utilized by the security forces.  
 By July 29th, the Free Syrian Army had formed.221 
 About a week after this, the Gulf countries finally started to take serious action 
against President Assad’s most recent brutal crackdown. On August 7th, Saudi Arabia’s 
former ruler, the late King Abdullah recalled his ambassador from Syria, prompting 
Bahrain and Syria to follow suit only hours later as they also withdrew their envoys from 
the country as well.222 The next day, King Abdullah condemned the Syrian regime and 
proclaimed in a written statement, “What is happening in Syria is not acceptable for 
Saudi Arabia. Syria should think wisely before it’s too late and issue and enact reforms 
that are not merely promises but actual reform. Either it chooses wisdom on its own or it 
will be pulled down into the depths of turmoil and loss.” 223 Both of these instances 
219 “Syria: Torture Fear for Dozens Arrested in Damascus Suburb,” Amnesty International, July 18, 2011.  
 
220 “We Live as in War: Crackdown on Protesters in the Governorate of Homs, Syria,” Human Rights 
Watch, November 11, 2011.  
 
221 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
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November 23, 2011), 9.  
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qualify as cheap, anti-regime signals as removing ambassadors to the country sends a 
clear message to the opposition that the government is no longer an acceptable authority 
in which their states are willing to conduct business with.  
 A good amount of time had passed and the atrocities were only mounting as the 
Syrian regime was becoming more brutal as every day went by and the oppositional 
forces were engaging in violent clashes with the security forces as well. In a speech on 
September 21st, President Obama made it clear that the al-Assad regime was no longer 
the legitimate ruling authority in the eyes of America. In his most striking statement yet 
he said, “The Syrian people have shown dignity and courage in their pursuit of justice -- 
protesting peacefully, standing silently in the streets, dying for the same values that this 
institution is supposed to stand for. And the question for us is clear: Will we stand with 
the Syrian people, or with their oppressors?..... There's no excuse for inaction. Now is the 
time for the United Nations Security Council to sanction the Syrian regime, and to stand 
with the Syrian people.”224 This concluding remark by President Obama is a cheap and 
anti-government signal as it openly states that they are done trying to work with the 
government anymore as they were continuously unwilling to implement any meaningful 
change towards a national dialogue aimed at a democratic transition to adhere to the 
demands of its citizens.  
 
Theme of Phase Three of the Uprising  
 The theme of this phase of the uprising is that the repression tactics of the regime, 
which had reached their most inhuman level yet during this period, combined with the 
dramatically increasing statements from external actors that are classified as cheap, anti-
regime signals, essentially caused local defense committees and the Free Syrian Army to 
form as citizens wanted to protect themselves and their families from the brutalities of the 
government But despite the creation of these organizations that were comprised of 
regular civilians and military defectors, the al-Assad regime continued to conduct their 
vicious repression methods with the same sadistic vigor as before.  
224 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United 
Nations General Assembly (September 21st, 2011).   
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 The oppressive tactics included placing a number of cities on lockdown, 
sometimes for weeks on end, which was the case in Dara’a as security forces blockaded 
off the entire town to prevent civilians from entering and exiting as well as prohibiting 
humanitarian supplies of food and medicine to be brought in for the residents. They also 
held various towns throughout the Homs governorate under siege and in the city of 
Qatana, they implemented an 11AM curfew and restricted civilians access to water and 
electricity. In all cases where entire towns were sealed off from the rest of the population, 
the military troops conducted abhorrently indiscriminate and violent repression 
techniques as they regularly targeted residential areas with live ammunition initially as a 
scare tactic that evolved into a regular repression method, snipers opened fire on any 
person who dared to disobey their orders to remain indoors and they conducted door-to-
door raids, arbitrarily arresting anyone suspected of supporting or being involved in 
demonstrations. In addition, the number of testimonies regarding the brutality of the 
regime became increasingly more frequent and disturbing to hear as the security forces 
were becoming more ruthless by the day as several accounts described how they opened 
fire on anyone without taking care if there were women and young children present. 
According to a dataset from the Political Terror Scale, for the year 2011 the repression 
tactics of the Syrian regime were coded as the highest level five. This means that the 
level of terror and brutality encompassed the majority of the population and those in 
powers have no qualms with utilizing any means necessary to subdue their opposition.225 
This is in stark contrast to the Bahraini regimes code of a level three in which more 
arbitrary arrests and unfair trials took place instead of such abhorrent uses of force 
against their own citizens.  
 But despite the escalation in the level of brutality, the protests continued to go on 
even as the government engaged in mass torture and ongoing killings of unarmed 
demonstrators and defenseless civilians. By June, a group of defectors from the Syrian 
Army announced the formation of the Khalid bin Walid Brigade that fought against 
members of the Syrian security forces. One resident of the Bab Sba’ village told Human 
Rights Watch that, “these committees that are formed by neighborhood youths are here to 
225  Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke and Daniel Arnon, The Political Terror Scale 
1976-2015 (2015), http://www.politicalterrorscale.org.  
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protect us from the shabiha shooting randomly at us; to ensure that security forces do not 
kill us while we protest.”226 Therefore, many civilians supported and justified these 
assaults as they were carried out with good intentions to defend the peaceful protesters 
right to assembly as they were consistently met with unlawful attacks by the security 
forces. The formation of such groups highlights the fact that the repression tactics 
adopted by the Syrian regime had resulted in a dangerous escalation of violence and by 
the end of this phase of the uprising a large number of military defectors had organized 
themselves into the “Free Syrian Army”.227  
 The increased severity in the indiscriminate and violent repression tactics carried 
out by the Syrian regime’s various security forces differs from the Bahraini regime’s use 
of force as by this time in the small Gulf country, the type of repression that was carried 
out was no where near the gross level of violence inflicted by the al-Assad regime against 
unarmed protesters and innocent bystanders. In addition, this caused the number of cheap 
anti-government signals in the Syrian case to be significantly greater compared to the few 
instances in which external actors denounced the Bahraini regimes actions. This is why 
no armed anti-government groups were established in Bahrain but explains why they 
formed in Syria. As the continued use of indiscriminate and violent repression persecuted 
the politically neutral masses as well as the anti-regime dissidents it caused them to join 
and support these armed opposition groups as they offered some protection from the 
government.228 As the signals from external actors remained cheap anti-government ones, 
it sent a clear message to the opposition that they would most likely receive support from 
their international allies should the uprising escalate even further. When this happens, it 
decreases the likelihood that dissidents will back down as the opposition now has the 
confidence needed to start to facilitate their attacks against the government’s troops.229 
226 “We Live as in War: Crackdown on Protesters in the Governorate of Homs, Syria,” Human Rights 
Watch, November 11, 2011.  
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Whereas the signals from external actors throughout the Bahraini uprising had the 
opposite effect as they were cheap, pro-government ones that deterred open hostilities 
from transforming into a more dangerous situation.  
 So far, the escalation theory of civil war onset accurately describes how the 
situation in Syria was on the path towards the onset of civil war. As Jeff Goodwin stated 
in his book, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991, 
“Armed insurgencies result from the violent suppression of the peaceful political 
activities of aggrieved people who have the capacity and opportunity to rebel.”230 
Signaling theory also provided the backbone in understanding how third parties can also 
effect the momentum of protest movements towards the onset of civil war. When the 
regimes repression tactics are indiscriminate and violent it prompts external actors to 
send signals of support in an offensive way to regime challengers, making them more 
willing to engage in violent clashes with the state now that they feel they have the 
backing from their international allies.231 And as the uprising progressed onwards it only 
continued to head down the inevitable path towards the onset of civil war. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This thesis set out to explore the reasons behind the vastly different outcomes of 
the Arab Spring uprisings that took place in Bahrain and Syria. The independent variable 
of repression and the intermediate variable of signals from external actors were examined 
to see if they were the causal mechanisms that effected whether or not the momentum of 
the protest movements would lead to civil war onset or not. The two hypotheses put forth 
sought to show how the specific type (violent/nonviolent) and target 
(selective/indiscriminate) of repression combined with whether or not the signals from 
external actors were made in favor of the government or its opposition mattered in 
predicting instances in which a protest movement will metastasize to the onset of civil 
war.  
 
Empirical Findings  
 The main findings that are thoroughly discussed throughout Chapter 4 and 5 
clearly indicate that the type and target of repression are important precursors to monitor 
in assessing whether an uprising is in grave danger of escalating to civil war onset. It also 
showed how the type and intensity of repression impacted the kind of signals sent from 
external actors in regards to whether or not they were in favor of the regime or its 
opposition and whether they were cheap or costly which also contributed to impacting the 
direction of the protest movements.  
 In Bahrain, the results indicated how the initial use of indiscriminate and violent 
repression techniques upped the momentum of the protests as many more politically 
neutral and disengaged citizens decided to become actively involved in the anti-regime 
demonstrations. But interestingly enough, the signals from external actors during this 
period did not overtly condemn the violent aggression towards unarmed protesters and 
merely offered support to the ruling al-Khalifa family. The international community 
simply suggested that the government engage in a national dialogue with its’ dissidents 
instead of continuing to use violent force against them. Although King Hamad took this 
advice, people’s anger was still growing due to the initial use of violent and 
indiscriminate repression tactics that continued to drive more civilians to the streets in 
protest. As time passed and no meaningful negotiations had been reached and the 
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demonstrators were only becoming more disruptive, the Bahraini regime’s security forces 
retreated back to their old methods as before. But this time, when they carried out their 
violent repression tactics they were more selective rather than indiscriminate in nature 
and they also conducted more nonviolent and indiscriminate techniques as well such as 
their mass arrest campaign. Therefore, this caused the signals from external actors to only 
mildly denounced the regimes repression tactics and they still remained reluctant to 
overtly condemn the government as a whole. Instead, prominent external actors kept 
offering their support to the Bahraini regime, letting the leaders know that they would be 
willing to step in on their side, should the situation get further out of hand.  
 While in Syria, the findings emphasize how the continued use of indiscriminate 
and violent repression methods which increased the number of cheap, anti-regime signals 
led to the onset of civil war. Initially, both regimes responded to the uprisings with 
violent and indiscriminate repression, but the difference is that the Syrian regime never 
chose to abandon these methods as the Bahraini authorities finally did. Because of this, 
many statements were made in support of the oppositional forces in Syria that alluded to 
the fact that they would receive backing from third parties should the situation continue 
to devolve. In this case, as the regime continued on its violent killing spree, not bothering 
to take into account who was going to be hurt, injured or killed by the security forces it 
only upped the momentum of the protest movements to the onset of civil war as armed 
anti-government groups started to form throughout the country.  
 
Theoretical Implications  
 The inflammation hypothesis within escalation theory states that the onset of civil 
war is most likely when violent repression is carried out indiscriminately as it engenders 
the majority of the population to engage in actively demonstrating against the unjust 
measures being carried out by the state. While signaling theory predicts that when this 
type and target of repression is carried out it causes external actors to send cheap anti-
government signals that cause the opposition to become more unwilling to reach mutual 
negotiations with the state as they believe that they have third party support should the 
regime continue to clamp down on their nonviolent activities. Both theories accurately 
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account for the reasons why Syria fell victim to an ongoing civil war while Bahrain was 
able to whether the storm.   
 
Recommendations for Future Research  
 This thesis hopes to have added valuable findings to the civil war onset literature 
which will help policy makers and crisis prevention teams better predict not only where 
civil wars are likely to take place, but when. Repression type and whom it targets are 
crucial elements to be aware of when monitoring an escalating situation but it is also 
important to keep in mind that no longer are civil wars to be thought of as a merely 
domestic phenomenon and the roles of the international community can also effect rising 
tensions within countries as well.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 As civil wars have been the number one type of conflict for several years now, 
understanding the vast complexities believed to trigger this type of intrastate violence are 
crucial now more than ever. This thesis hopes to have added valuable information 
regarding more understudied factors that can also lead to this type of warfare.  
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